MILITARY REVIEW

OF THE

Campaign in Virginia & Maryland,

UNDER

Generals John C. Fremont, N. P. Banks, Irwin McDowell, Franz Sigel, John Pope, James S. Wadsworth, Wm. H. Halleck and George B. McClellan.

IN

1862,

BY

FRED'K A. PETERSEN.

He that is truly dedicated to war
Hath no self-love; nor he that loves himself
Hath not essentially, but by circumstances,
The name of valor.

SHAKSPERE.

A Contribution to the Future History of the United States.

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MILITARY REVIEW

OF THE

CAMPAIGN IN VIRGINIA & MARYLAND

In 1862.

On the 12th day of March, 1862, the following orders were published in the City of Washington:

War Gazette Official.

The President's General War Order *No.* 1.

Executive Mansion, Washington, January 27, 1862.

Ordered, That the 22d of February, 1862, be the day for a general movement of the land and naval forces of the United States against the insurgent forces; that especially the army at and about Fortress Monroe, the army of the Potomac, the army of Western Virginia, the army near Munfordsville, Ky., the flotilla at Cairo, and a naval force in the Gulf of Mexico, be ready for a movement on that day.

That all the other forces, both landed and naval, with their respective commanders, obey existing orders for the time, and be ready to obey additional orders when duly given.

That the heads of departments, and especially the Secretaries of War and the Navy, with all their subordinates, and the General-in-Chief, with all other commanders and subordinates of the landed and naval forces, will severally be held to their strict and full responsibilties for the prompt execution of this order.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

The President's General War Order *No.* 2.

Executive Mansion, Washington, March 8th, 1862.

Ordered, That the Major-General commanding the Army of the Potomac proceed forthwith to organize that part of the said army destined to enter upon active operations, including the reserve, but excluding the troops to be left in the fortifications about Washington, into four army corps, to be commanded according to seniority of rank, as follows:

The first corps, consisting of four divisions, by Major-General I. McDowell; the second corps, consisting of three divisions, by Brigadier-General Sumner; the third corps, consisting of three divisions, by Brigadier-General Heintzelman; the fourth corps, consisting of three divisions, by Brigadier-General Keyes.

2d. That the divisions now commanded by the respective Generals form part of their respective corps.

3d. That the forces left for the defence of Washington will be placed in command of Brigadier-General James S. Wadsworth, who shall also be Military Governor of the District of Columbia.

4th. That this order be executed with such promptness and dispatch as not to delay the commencement of the operations already directed to be undertaken by the Army of the Potomac.

5th. The fifth army corps to be commanded by Major-General N. P. Banks, will be formed from his own and General Shields' (late General Lander's) divisions.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

The President's War Order *No.* 3.

Executive Mansion, Washington, March 11th, 1862.

Major-General McClellan having personally taken the field at the head of the Army of the Potomac, until otherwise ordered, is relieved from the command of the other military departments, he maintaining command of the Department of the Potomac. Ordered, further, that the departments now under the respective commands of Generals Halleck and Hunter, together with so much of that under General Buell as lies west of a north and south line drawn through Knoxville, Tenn., be consolidated, and designated the Department of the Mississippi, and that, until otherwise ordered, Major-General Halleck have command of said department. Ordered, also, that the country west of the Department of the Potomac, and east of the Department of the Mississippi, be a military department to be called the Mountain Department, and that the same be commanded by Major-General Fremont. That all the commanders of Departments, after the receipt of this order by them respectively, report severally and directly to the Secretary of War, and that prompt, full, and frequent reports will be expected of all and each of them.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

In issuing the General War Orders above reprinted, the President for the first time exercised, in person, the authority as Commander-in-Chief of the army and navy of the United States—an authority which, as far as the army is concerned, he had to the last day of October, 1861, delegated to General Winfield Scott, and since the first day of November, 1861, to General George B. McClellan, of whom, in his Message to Congress, December 3d, 1861, he says: "With

"the retirement of Gen Scott came the executive duty of appointing "in his stead a General-in-Chief for the army. It is a fortunate cir- "cumstance that neither in council nor country was there, so far as I "know, any difference of opinion as to the proper person to be se- "lected. The retiring chief repeatedly expressed his opinion in "favor of General McClellan for the position, and in this the nation "seemed to give an unanimous concurrence. The designation of Gene- "ral McClellan is, therefore, in a considerable degree, the selection of "the country as well as of the executive, and hence there is better rea- "son to hope there will be given him the confidence and cordial support, "thus by fair implication promised, and without which he cannot, "with so full efficiency, save the country."

What reason had the President to interfere personally with the affairs of the army, when General McClellan continued to be General-in-Chief, and had been especially charged with the entire command of the army? It cannot be want of confidence in General McClellan's capacity or loyalty, because Order No. 1 leaves General McClellan in command of the entire army more than six weeks after it had been executed; and the President could not possibly leave a man, whom he has reason to doubt, in so important a position. It cannot be the imperative necessity of issuing an order to the army which precluded the loss of time necessary for its communication to the General-in-Chief, because Order No. 1, in a military point of view, orders very little, if anything, except *that January 22d, 1862, be the day for a general movement against the insurgent forces*, and even this it modifies at once, by stating that certain six different armies (that is, the entire army) shall be *ready for* a movement on that day; it next orders that the forces shall *obey existing* orders for the time, and *be ready* to obey *additional* orders when *duly given;* a fundamental principle in all military organizations, for the express republication of which, in so unusual a form, there does not seem to exist any necessity whatever; finally, the order informs the Secretaries of War and of the Navy, the Commander-in-Chief, and all other commanders and subordinates, that they will be held to strict and full responsibilities for the prompt execution of the order, which, of course, does not burden them with any new responsibility. It cannot be that the President had changed his views as to the practicability and correctness of the plan of the campaign for 1862, as laid out by Gen. McClellan, because the order does not indicate the least change in the said plan; McClellan proceeded in its execution, and the President allows six weeks to pass by, before he publishes his orders,

and therefore, McClellan's plan is adhered to six weeks longer; besides this, the President professes to adhere to it, wherever opportunity offers to express his opinion. It cannot be that the President thinks General McClellan less prompt, precise, or expeditious in the issuing of orders for a movement than himself; because order No. 2 proves in its first three specifications that an important part of the organization of the Army of the Potomac, (that is, its formation in army corps, upon which the efficacy of that army seems materially to depend, as well as the organization of a sufficient force for the security, and, in case of need, for the defence of the works around Washington,) had been entirely overlooked in War Order No. 1; while specification 4 shows that no operations of the Army of the Potomac as yet had been undertaken, and that consequently, as far as the last named army is concerned, said Order No. 1 had been issued prematurely, and therefore had better not been issued at all. It cannot possibly be that the President had differed with General McClellan as to the *proper time when, the co-operative execution of the latter's plan* for the campaign *ought to be commenced,* and that the President, overruling McClellan's advice, had issued Order No. 1; because the long delay between the date of the order and its publication, would go far to show that the President had become convinced, that he had issued it *long before the proper time.* While War Orders No. 1 and 2 do not seem to throw any light upon the reason for which they were issued, the following letter, early in March published in and directed to the editor of the New York Tribune, by Mr. Edwin M. Stanton, may perhaps lead us in the proper direction:

SIR: I cannot suffer undue merit to be ascribed to my official action. The glory of our recent victories belongs to the gallant officers that fought the battles. No share of it belongs to me.

Much has recently been said of military combination and organizing victory. I hear such phrases with apprehension. They commenced in infidel France with the Italian campaign, and resulted in Waterloo. Who can organize victory? Who can combine the elements of success on the battle field? We owe our recent victories to the spirit of the Lord, that moved our soldiers to dash into battle and filled the hearts of our enemies with terror and dismay. The inspiration that conquered in battle was in the hearts of the soldiers and from on high; and wherever there is the same inspiration there will be the same results. Patriotic spirit with resolute courage in officers and men is a military combination that never failed.

We may well rejoice at the recent victories, for they teach us that battles are to be won now and by us in the same and only manner

that they were ever won by any people or in any age since the days of Joshua, by boldly pursuing and striking the foe. What, under the blessing of Providence, I conceive to be the true organization of victory and military combination to end this war, was declared in a few words by General Grant's message to General Buckner: "I propose to move immediately on your works."

Yours truly,

EDWIN M. STANTON.

Mr. Stanton was appointed Secretary of War about the middle of January. A controversy between the daily Press of the various political parties, as to what General had laid out the plan of the campaign, in the execution of which, Burnside in North Carolina, Dupont in South Carolina, and Generals Grant, Buell and Thomas in Kentucky and in Tennessee, had gained advantages over the rebels; in which controversy Mr. Edwin M. Stanton's name was also mentioned as the originator of the said plan, at a time when he, a lawyer of high standing, was deeply engaged in his profession. In consequence of this allusion to his merit in the matter, the Secretary of War wrote the above letter to the editor in whose paper the allusion had been made. However much he may try to conceal it by infidel France, by the spirit of the Lord, by inspiration, by patriotic spirit, by Joshua, and by the blessing of Providence, it is nevertheless clear, that Mr. Stanton's letter is nothing more nor less than one continuous slur, at military science and military leaders in general, on Napoleon Bonaparte, the most brilliant of them, and at General McClellan in particular. He had made the plan for the campaign of 1862, and had repeatedly declared, that he could and would not order a general movement until *all* the necessary preliminary combinations would have been completed. Let us see how far Mr. Stanton's apprehension, with which he hears the phrase of *military combination* and *organizing victory* is well-founded, and how far his argument against those phrases is correct, by investigating events which had taken place only a short time before Mr. Stanton became Secretary of War, and which therefore ought to have been fresh in his memory, when he wrote the letter in question. At the battle of Belmont, November 1861, where General Ulysses S. Grant, (whose spirited message to General Buckner, the Secretary of War conceives to declare *the true organization of victory and military combination,*) had supreme command, our soldiers rushed to battle and filled the hearts of the enemy with terror and dismay, but only till the superior military combinations of the rebel generals could be brought to bear upon General Grant's forces; when for the very want of a

proper organization to secure victory, he had to retreat from the enemy's camp, which at the first rush of his gallant men, he had actually occupied. Not having exercised strategical wisdom and experience to protect his line of retreat and his point of embarkation, he suffered fearfully, and re-embarked only a small portion of his terribly cut-up corps. General Grant, and General McClernand under him, tried to do his duty to the best of his understanding at the time ; but he lacked experience, did not completely mature his operations before he commenced its execution, and consequently failed and was badly defeated. His more perfect combinations at a later period proved how he profited by the lesson received at Belmont. Does Mr. Stanton mean to say that *the spirit of the Lord* who inspired General Grant's soldiers to rush into battle at Belmont, made right about face, when they had entered the rebel camp, and then went and inspired the rebels to rush upon our brave fellows, and kill them and drive them into the river ? or that General Grant and his brave troops had lost *their patriotic spirit, and resolute courage* when they had fought their way into the enemy's camp ? Or, that the *inspiration from high*, entered first the hearts of General Grant's army, and then slipt out and went into the hearts of the rebels ? Or, that the *spirit of the Lord*, in consideration that both of them had been very naughty, directed that by the *blessing of Providence*, first the soldiers of the Confederate States, and then those of the United States of America, should receive a sound thrashing ? We know him to be too good a lawyer, if not Secretary of War, to believe in any such blasphemous nonsense. We for our part, firmly believe that the Almighty will bless our good cause and give us the victory in the end ; but we expect this gift precisely in the same manner as he gives us our daily bread ; that is after we have made all reasonable exertions to earn it ourselves. To win battles, we must understand to make military combinations *to gain*, and proper provisions *to secure victory*, otherwise we will see many repetitions of the affair at Belmont, because the greatest captain of modern history, truly said : " In war, Providence is generally with the heaviest artillery." That is with artillery placed in the best position. Mr. Stanton forgets what he has read, or ought to have read, long before he became Secretary of War, in Greek and Latin, about the military combinations of Xenophon, of Xerxes, of Caesar, of Hannibal, and others ; when he says, these *phrases* commenced in infidel France, with the Italian campaign, and ended with Waterloo. Aside of this historical incorrectness, how does the history of the

French wars, during the time fixed by the Secretary of War, justify him in hearing "these phrases with apprehension?"

The corruption prevailing at the court of the elder Bourbons had, during about twenty years next previous to the time to which Mr. Stanton alludes, been more or less systematically infused into the aristocracy, and through them, into the French army, where the scions of nobility controlled the highest commissions; (because a corrupt commander is sure to corrupt his entire command in an astonishingly short time). The study and practice of military science was subsequently more and more neglected, and the French army became, in the same proportion, despised by other military nations, in particular by the German powers, who, thanks to the military genius of Frederick the Great, of Prussia, and to the lessons a-la-Belmont, in military combinations, and in perfect military organization which he had given to the various leading generals of Maria Theresa, of Austria. They possessed well officered and perfectly disciplined armies, which, at the instigation, and with the pecuniary aid of England, that had no organized army, they boldly sent to the French frontiers, with the intention of upholding or reinstating the rotten dynasty of the banished royal family. The French armies were defeated almost in every engagement, and if it had not been for the deep-rooted hostility of the people in the provinces against the foreign invader, the armies of the coalition, as the German armies were called, would probably have penetrated to the capital of France. But the military genius of Napoleon Bonaparte, perfectly regulated and disciplined by long and profound study of the science of war, led the indignant and aroused masses, by the most sublime military combinations, across the Alps into that Italian campaign,—to which the honorable Secretary of War alludes in his *Tribune* letter,—and on the 12th of April, 1796, at Montenotte, gained his first victory over the Austrian field marshal D'Argenteau. Almost without a single serious reverse, frequently against largely superior forces, led by commanders who had gained great fame as military leaders, (by keeping strictly in the beaten track laid out by those, who had become stationary, when Frederick the Great finished his lesson to them). Many there were then, as there are now, who, although Napoleon had in an almost incredibly short time, driven the Austrian armies out of Italy, declared that nothing but good luck and the courage of the army had caused these victories, and that Napoleon's military strategy and tactics had nothing to do with it. How far this opinion had spread, may be well illustrated by the following historical facts:

Frederick William III., king of Prussia, anticipating the possibility of collisions with the young emperor, early in 1805, called a council of state, for the purpose of deciding upon a policy to be adopted by Prussia in her future relations with France. Several of the oldest generals were in attendance; the king, during the deliberation presented the view whether, in consideration of the unparalleled successes of the young chieftain against the best Austrian generals, which seemed to indicate an entirely new strategy on his part, it might not, after all, be the wisest policy to try to come to a peaceful understanding, or, perhaps, to an alliance with him? When general Von Branchitsch, a man high in rank by long service, twisting his moustache, replied, "He had the honor of assuring his majesty, upon his honor, that in the Prussian army there were at least five or six such Napoleon Bonapartes." Upon this assurance, the king decided to side with Austria against Napoleon, which decision led to the battle of Jena, October 17, 1806, where the Prussian army was completely routed, before the commanders were fully aware that they had been attacked; and to the peace of Tilsit, July 7th and 9th, 1807, where, by the grace of Napoleon, Frederick William III., retained a very small portion of his kingdom. These same military combinations, commencing in Italy in 1796, carried Napoleon and his French armies, in fifteen years, almost without any reverses, victorious from Italy through Holland, Belgium, and all the German sovereignties, without a single exception, to the western frontiers of the Russian empire, which they reached in October, 1812.* So that if military combinations are properly applied by the generals at the head of our armies, they will operate in a similar manner as they did in the case referred to in Mr. Stanton's letter. The rebellion will, by their application, be crushed in a comparatively very short time. Mr. Stanton's reason for his apprehension, in hearing the phrase alluded to, are, therefore, not better than his explanation of the real causes *to which we owe our recent victories.*

When, after having thus glanced at Mr. Stanton's *Tribune* letter, we read the President's War Order, No. 3, we find that this order:

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* It would exceed the limits of this essay to analyze the reasons which caused the destruction of Napoleon's army in Russia, his defeats in 1813 and 1814, and his final overthrow, June 18, 1815. But it is certain, beyond all doubt, that neglect of complete combinations, and well organized victories on his side, and the adoption of Napoleon's principles to the most complete combinations and organizations by his opponents, were among the most effective agencies to bring about that result.

1st. Relieves General McClellan of his command as general-in-chief of the armies of the United States, and assigns him the command of *the Department of the Potomac.*

2d. That it consolidates the commands under Generals Halleck, Hunter, and a portion of that under General Buell, in the Department of the Mississippi, under General Halleck.

3d. That it relieves Generals Hunter and Buell of the commands of departments.

4th. That it creates a new department, bound east by the department of the Potomac, and west by the department of the Mississippi, to be called the *Mountain Department.*

5th. That it reinstates in to a command General John C. Fremont, who had been deprived of his command in October, 1861.

6th. That it gives General Fremont command of the new Mountain Department.

7th. That it orders the commanders of all the departments to report severally and direct to *the Secretary of War*, and consequently gives to Mr. Edwin M. Stanton, in addition to his office as Secretary of War, that of *de facto* General-in-Chief of the Armies of the United States.

Order No. 3, therefore, makes up in importance of its contents, what Orders No. 1 and No. 2 seem to be void of; and it goes far to confirm our opinion that, because all these important changes in the organization and the command of the army, were considered necessary for its efficiency against the enemy, the President's War Order No. 1, was issued decidedly before the proper time. But even the material changes in its organization, produced by order No. 3, do not seem to have given to the army the desired efficiency to crush the rebellion in the shortest possible time. Mr. Stanton's desire for executive employment seems still to have exceeded the enormous responsibilities already assumed; because, early in April, 1862, the President directs two more military departments to be created, one of them to embrace that portion of Virginia and Maryland lying between the Mountain Department and the Blue Ridge, to be called the *Department of the Shenandoah;* the other to be designated the Department of the *Rappahanock*, and to comprise the portion of Virginia east of the Blue Ridge, and West of the Potomac and the Fredericksburg and Richmond Railroad, including the District of Columbia and the Patuxent. General McDowell is placed in command of the latter, and General Banks of the former Department. This operation for improving the efficiency of the army, it will be seen, deprives General

McClellan of two army corps belonging to the Army of the Potomac, besides of a good slice of the Department of the Potomac; and it adds to the corps under General McDowell, (already the largest of any in the Army of the Potomac, by the President's War Order No. 2) the entire force, by that same order, placed under command of Brig. General James S. Wadsworth, to protect the works around the City of Washington.

All these changes in the army and reductions in the extent of Gen. McClellan's official province, it must be remembered, were made at a time when, under that general's chief command, a succession of Union victories had been achieved; by Burnside, at Roanoke Island; by Thomas and Schoepf, at Somerset and Bowling Green; by Grant, at Fort Henry and Donelson; and by Lander, in Western Virginia. If there could be a possibility for a lasting advantage to the instigator, we would be strongly tempted to the belief that all the above noted peculiar changes in the organization and command of the army, were made in strict compliance with the old adage *divide et impera.*

Considering Mr. Stanton's Tribune letter, in which, as we have seen, without regard to historical truth, and in violation of sound common sense, he tries to criticise and depreciate the strategical principles of the General-in-Chief, and consequently to undermine his influence with the army. Considering that by every one of these charges McClellan's command and official influence is reduced, while the official importance of Mr. Edwin M. Stanton is extended, and his direct control over the army increased, it does not seem likely, although Abraham Lincoln is to the country responsible for all these peculiar remodelings of the army, that there could be found in all New England a single Yankee who would not guess that Mr. Stanton is the real instigator of all these mischievous intermeddlings. This then is the manner in which the confidence and cordial support—by the President in his message, Dec. 3, '61, delared, *by fair implication promised, and without which he can not with so full efficiency serve the country*—were given to General McClellan by those highest in the country's offices.

The organization of an army and the character of the commanders of army corps, constitute in time of war the most influential agencies for the co operation of the several corps and the success of the army. Let us inquire what military or other achievements have secured to the respective Generals placed in command of the various army corps in Virginia, the distinction of being by the President's War Order, entrusted with commissions, of so great influ-

ence in the speedy or slow termination of this expensive and terrible war, therefore of vast importance to the country, and of enormous responsibility to the Generals themselves? Commencing on the right wing, we find John C. Fremont, Major General United States Army, in command of the *Mountain Department.* General Fremont had served in the Army of the United States prior to the acquisition of the State of California; he had explored the country west of the Mississippi, and had, at the head of a small command, penetrated as far as California; this expedition, although not made against an enemy, caused the gallant leader some trouble, placed him in a false position towards his superior officers, caused him to be court-martialled, and finally to resign his commission in the army. On the other hand it secured to him a landed estate of, according to general opinion, regal extent, and of immense value, known as the Mariposa Grant, the title ofwhich, although long disputed, has finally been adjudicated to the General. In a military point of view, this exploration was of no significance, certainly not as in any possible manner indicating qualifications for a command of large force.*

Having attended to his California estates for several years, John C. Fremont returned to New York, and was nominated by his political friends for the office of President of the United States, and thereby became widely known all over the Union. He was not elected, and was, four years later, when the Republican party again had to select a nominee, dropped by them to make room for Abraham Lincoln. The outbreak of the rebellion found Mr. Fremont in Europe; he at once exerted his influence in favor of the North, secured and sent to Wash-

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* To show what can be done with a few men. We quote from a pamphlet entitled "Fremont and McClellan, Yonkers, New York," where, at page 7, the military achievements of General Fremont, are thus summed up: "Fremont with twenty-five men, had crossed the great mountains and deserts of America, amid untold hardships, yet with signal success; subsisting his horses on the bark of trees, and his men upon the flesh of horses, and had, with this force, recruited by a few Americans resident in California, while still unaware of the existence of war with Mexico, hoisted the Bear Flag of California independance, prevented the British fleet from seizing this province, driven out the Mexican forces, and when he learned of the existence of our war with Mexico, exchanged the Bear Flag for the Stars and Stripes; thus giving to his country, as a province, California, the land whose rivers ran over glistening sands of gold. As a soldier, it was his good fortune to win to his country a province whose untold wealth repaid the cost incurred by Taylor and Scott in conquering territory to be afterwards surrendered."

ington a splendid battery of rifled cannon, with large quantities of other arms, and returned with his family to his native land. Before his arrival, the President appointed him Major General of the United States Army, a rank at that time held only by General McClellan. When General Fremont reached Washington, he was placed in command of the Department of the West, headquarters St. Louis, and entered upon his duties in the early part of August, 1861.

Before the troops under General Fremont had made a movement *en masse*,* Colonel Blair of Missouri, a leader of the so-called Republican party, presented serious charges against General Fremont—was put under and kept in arrest by the General for some time, and was then restored to his command without any sort of trial, and without having retracted any of his charges. The importance thereof caused General Thomas, Adjutant General of the army of the United States under General Scott, to be sent to the headquarters of General Fremont for the purpose of investigating the charges preferred by Colonel Blair. The report of General Thomas to the Commander-in-Chief of our armies, bore out Colonel Blair's charges. President Lincoln, deprived General Fremont of his command without trial or court-martial, October 20th, 1861.† To military men it was and is to this day a matter of surprise and deep regret that General Fremont lacked, to say the least, the respect due to the army of the United States, wherein he holds a high commission, the proper self-respect and *esprit du corps*, to demand a court-martial.

The charges of Colonel Blair and those of General Thomas had never been retracted. General Fremont had not sought an opportunity to prove them to be false. The staff officers of General Fremont were almost all dismissed from the army, some of them having insisted upon trial by court-martial, have not been tried yet. General Thomas is still Adjutant General of the army; but four months after he has been deprived of his command, War Order No. 3 places General John C. Fremont in command of a new department.

Measures like this must of necessity operate detrimentally upon the *morale*, the *esprit du corps*, the discipline, and consequently upon the

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* The two brilliant affairs under General Franz Sigel at Carthage and at Rolla, although they demonstrated the military eminence of that gallant soldier, were participated in only by a very insignificant and detached force.

† The statement on page 18 previously mentioned of the *Crisis* pamphlet, that McClellan is responsible for the removal of Fremont from his command is untrue, because General McClellan did not become General-in-Chief of the Army until November, 1861.

efficiency of the army. The conviction thereof in Europe is so complete that in the present century, in no country except in Turkey, the government would appoint a General to a command whose fair fame was in the least tarnished by any unrepudiated charges. No, General, if so appointed, would accept a command before he had, by the verdict of a court-martial, been fully and honorably cleared of any suspicion of a conduct unbecoming an officer; because every officer is fully aware that accepting a command without having previously demanded and obtained opportunity to reestablish his fair fame, he would make himself a target for every officer in his command.

Immediately after the last Italian war, in which the new strategy and tactics of Louis Napoleon, for the first time astonished the military world, Lieutenant General von Bonin, the Secretary of War to the King of Prussia, presented to the government a plan for the reorganization of the Prussian army; the King, after hearing Bonin's explanations of his plan, in a full Cabinet Council, approved of it, and ordered it to be prepared in form of a bill, to be presented for the approbation of Congress. While General von Bonin was yet engaged in the execution of this order, the King sent for him, and in a private interview, told him he had, on reflection, ordered one of his aids to introduce some merely formal changes in von Bonin's original plan, which he wished him to examine and to adopt in the bill he was preparing. General von Bonin read the amendments and informed his Majesty that he would not in the least object to any merely formal alterations in his original plan, as long as the fundamental principle thereof was adhered to; that the amendment handed to him, by the King, entirely changed the principle upon which his own plan had been based, and that consequently he had to regret the necessity that prevented him to adopt the amendment in his own bill. The King replied that he would consider the matter.

The following day General von Bonin received two letters from the King; the first deprived him of the office of Secretary of War, for disobedience to the orders of the King; the second appointed him Commander-in-Chief of the eighth army corps, on the French frontier, the most important military command in the army. General von Bonin at once replied, that an officer who had been so unfortunate as to deserve to be deprived of his command for disobedience was forever unworthy to hold a command in the Prussian army; he therefore respectfully tendered his resignation as an officer of the army, to take effect immediately. Congress rejected the amended plan for the army reorganization, and at the present moment this same question has caused the second ministerial crisis in Berlin.

Our own army, we very much fear, will never be what the country has a right to expect it to be, before our officers understand to act upon principles similar to those expressed by Lieutenant-General van Bonin. In Turkey this principle has been neglected, in consequence of the universal corruption with which that beautiful country is cursed. Officers charged with malfeasance were deprived of a command to-day, and trusted with another one a few days afterwards; the consequence was that, Marshal Diebitch, the Russian commander-in-chief, in 1829, found that the commander of almost every fortress (however impregnable by nature and artificial fortifications), had his fixed price for which he surrendered; so that the Russian army reached Adrianople, a short distance from Constantinople, before the Sultan considered it possible that the siege of the first frontier fortress could have fairly been commenced. The Turkish High-Admiral when sent with a large fleet against the rebellious Pacha of Egypt, took the entire fleet in to the Egyptian port and surrendered it to the rebel. Since that time the *esprit du corps* in the army of the Sultan has been revived and encouraged in every possible manner; corruption has been punished whenever detected, and the result of this change of sentiment has been demonstrated in the many brilliant affairs performed by the army as well as the navy of the Sultan during the last Crimean war. Omar Pasha has established a fair reputation for the army, and the brilliant fight of a single Turkish vessel against five Russian steamers in the disgraceful affair of Sinope, have gained respect for the "sick man's" navy.

General N. P. Banks, the commander of the Department of the Shenandoah, on the left of General Fremont's department, had distinguished himself as Speaker of the House of Representatives, as Governor of Massachusetts, where he caused a complete reorganization of the militia, which he militarised so far, that at the outbreak of the rebellion, Colonel Butler's Massachusetts regiment was the first in the country on its march to Washington. Declining the re-nomination for Governor, General Banks found in the management of an extensive Railroad system a new field for the display and development of his executive talents. This so much the better qualified him, at the outbreak of the rebellion, to accept a command of a Division in the army of the Potomac. By earnest study, by strict military conduct, by the rapid promotion of the efficiency of his men, by the well-conceived disposition of his forces, to guard the line of the upper Potomac, and by his successful occupation of Harper's Ferry, he had proved his adaptedness for a military command on a larger scale, and had receiv-

ed the appointment as Major-General of Volunteers. On the left of General Banks' department joined the department of the Rappahannock, under Major-General I. McDowell.

General McDowell at the commencement of the rebellion held a commission as Major in the United States army, was very soon called to Washington, promoted to a Brigadier-Generalship, and entrusted with the chief command of an army in and around Washington in June, 1861. This army went under his command into what is known as the first battle of Bull Run; General McDowell came out of it and made the following official report:

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT NORTH-EASTERN VIRGINIA,
ARLINGTON, Va., August 4, 1861.

Lieutenant-Colonel E. D. TOWNSEND, Assistant Adjutant-General,
Headquarters of the Army, Washington, D. C.

COLONEL—I have the honor to submit the following report of the battle of the 21st of July, near Manassas, Virginia. It has been delayed till this time from the inability of the subordinate commanders to get earlier a true account of the state of their commands.

* * * * * * *

The divisions were ordered to march at half-past two o'clock A.M., so as to arrive on the ground early in the day, and thus avoid the heat which is to be expected at this season. There was delay in the first division getting out of its camp on the road, and the other divisions were in consequence between two and three hours behind the time appointed—a great misfortune, as events turned out.

* * * * * * *

Inasmuch as General McDowell had never before held a command, a military reading of his report will afford the fairest basis for an opinion regarding his qualification and merits as a commander of an army.

The report shows everywhere the General's endeavor to report the facts as they actually occurred, and to neither conceal nor to magnify anything.

After having given a description of the proceedings during the 21st day of July which, (after only a portion of his army had seen the enemy, or had been engaged, he says,) resulted in a hasty retreat, a complete rout, and finally in an irresistable panic; carrying everything in one promiscuous mass of men and beast before it, and some of the disorganised troops by way of Washington as far as New York; and after having claimed credit for distinguished conduct for a great many officers of the various corps and of his staff, he proceeds:

As my position may warrant, even if it does not call for some explanation of the causes, as far as they can be seen, which led to the results herein stated, I trust it may not be out of place if I refer in a few words to the immediate antecedents of the battle. When I

submitted to the General-in-Chief, in compliance with his verbal instructions, the plan of operations and estimate of force required, the time I was to proceed to carry it into effect was fixed for the 8th July, Monday. Every facility possible was given me by the General-in-Chief and heads of the administrative departments in making the necessary preparations. But the regiments, owing, I was told, to want of transportation, came over slowly. Many of them did not come across till eight or nine days after the time fixed upon, and went forward without my even seeing them, and without having been together before in a brigade. The sending reinforcements to General Patterson, by drawing off the wagons, was a further and unavoidable cause of delay. Notwithstanding the herculean efforts of the Quartermaster General, and his favoring me in every way, the wagons for ammunition, subsistence, &c., and the horses for the trains and the artillery, did not all arrive for more than a week after the time appointed to move. I was not even prepared as late as the 15th ultimo, and the desire I should move became great, and it was wished I should not, if possible, delay longer than Tuesday, the 16th ultimo, When I did set out, on the 16th, I was still deficient in wagons for subsistence. But I went forward, trusting to their being procured in time to follow me. The trains thus hurriedly gathered together, with horses, wagons, drivers, and wagon managers, all new and unused to each other, moved with difficulty aud disorder, and was the cause of a day's delay in getting the provisions forward, making it necessary to make on Sunday the attack we should have made on Saturday. I could not, with every exertion, get forward with the troops earlier than we did. I wished to go to Centreville the second day, which would have taken us there on the 17th, and enabled us, so far as they were concerned, to go into action on the 19th, instead of the 21st, but when I went forward from Fairfax Court House beyond Germantown, to urge them forward, I was told it was impossible for the men to march further. They had only come from Vienna, about six miles, and it was not more than six and a half miles further to Centreville—in all a march of twelve and a half miles; but the men were foot-weary, not so much, I was told, by the distance marched, as by the time they had been on foot, caused by the obstructions in the road, and the slow pace we had to move to avoid ambuscades. The men were, moreover, unaccustomed to marching, their bodies not in condition for that kind of work, and not used to carrying even the load of light marching order. We crossed Bull Run with about 18,000 men of all arms, the fifth division (Miles and Richardson's brigade) on the left, at Blackburn's Ford to Centreville, and Schenck's brigade, of Tyler's division, on the left of the road, near the stone bridge, not participating in the main action. The numbers opposed to us have been variously estimated. I may safely say, and avoid even the appearance of exaggeration, that the enemy brought up all he could which were not kept engaged elsewhere. He had notice of our coming on the 17th, and had from that time until the 21st to bring up whatever he had. It is known that in estimating the force to go against Manassas, I engaged not to have

to do with the enemy's forces under Johnson, then kept in check in the valley by Major General Patterson, or those kept engaged by Major General Butler, and I know every offort was made by the General-in-Chief that this should be done, and that even if Johnson joined Beauregard, it would not be because he could be followed by General Patterson, but from causes not necessary for me to refer to, if I knew them at all. This was not done, and the enemy was free to assemble from every direction in numbers only limited by the amount of this railroad rolling stock and his supply of provisions. To the forces, therefore, we drove in from Fairfax Court House, Fairfax Station, Germantown, and Centreville, and those under Beauregard at Manassas, must be added those under Johnston from Winchester, and those brought up by Davis from Richmond and other places at the South, to which is to be added the levy *en masse* ordered by the Richmond authorities, which was ordered to assemble at Manassas. What all this amounted to I cannot say—certainly much more than we attacked them with. I could not, as I have said more early, push on faster, nor could I delay. A large and the best part of my forces were three months' volunteers, whose term of service was about to expire, but who were sent forward as having long enough to serve for the purpose of the exhibition. On the eve of the battle, the Fourth Pennsylvania regiment of volunteers and the battery of volunteer artillery of the New York Eighth militia, whose term of service expired, insisted on their discharge. I wrote to the regiment, expressing a request for them to remain a short time, and the Hon. Secretary of War, who was at the time on the ground, tried to induce the battery to remain at least five days. Bnt in vain. They insisted on their discharge that night. It was granted, and the next morning, when the army moved forward into battle, these troops moved to the rear to the sound of the enemy's cannon. In the next few days, day by day, I should have lost ten thousand of the best armed, drilled, officered, and disciplined troops in the army. In other words, every day which added to the strength of the enemy made us weaker. In conclusion, I desire to say, in reference to the events of the 21st ult., that the general order for the battle to which I referred was, with slight modifications, literally conformed to; that the corps were brought over Bull Run in the manner proposed, and put into action as before arranged, and that up to late in the afternoon every movement ordered was carrying us successfully to the object we had proposed before starting—that of getting to the railroad leading from Manassas to the valley of Virginia, and going on it far enough to break up and destroy the communication and interviens between the forces under Beauregard and those under Johnston. And could we have fought a day or a few hours sooner, there is everything to show how we could have continued successful, even against the odds with which we contended. I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

IRWIN McDOWELL,
Brigadier-General Commanding.

We see that, twelve days before the 21st of August, General McDowell intended to move; that, as he says, notwithstanding the greatest efforts of, and all possible facilities given him by the commander-in-chief, and the heads of the departments, the regiments did not come in till eight or nine days later. What a horrible state must the organization of the army have been in, if the combined exertions of all these high personages, to acknowledge which the general twice takes occasion, could not provide better results than this utter failure in everything? Who was to blame that the regiments went forward without the general having seen them; and without having been together before in a brigade? Certainly nobody but General McDowell himself. The regiments could not come to look for or to see the general, but it was his business and his most important duty to go and see them, to get acquainted with them, and make himself known to them; to order them to be brigaded; to designate the several regiments for every brigade, and to order what brigade drill they should become accustomed to. If he was not even prepared on the fifteenth of May to move, what had he, as a soldier, to do with a *desire* and a *wish* that *he should not delay beyond the sixteenth*? And how could he think of ever justifying himself for having moved against an enemy, before being in every respect completely prepared and ready? As a general, responsible for the lives and safety of every man in his command, and as a soldier, he has to receive and to give *orders;* with *desires* and *wishes* he has nothing whatever to do; but in particular has he not to jeopardise the lives of the men entrusted to him. Even, when on the 17th day of July, he joined his troops on the march, and found them foot-sore and unprepared for a campaign, he did not see the folly, nay crime, he was committing, in seeking an engagement with an enemy, without the most absolute necessity. The reasons given why he could not delay any longer, are the most powerful reasons that should have induced him not to seek an engagement at all. If, as he says, by the expiration of the term of service of a large proportion of his men, his army would day by day have been reduced and become weaker; he, and every military man, ought to have foreseen that a defeat in battle (and he had, according to his own statement of facts, nothing else to expect), would deprive him and the country of the entire army, and place the capitol and the Government at the mercy of the enemy. Still more unwarrantable appears the forward movement in the face, first of the distinct declaration of Colonel Burnside, of Rhode Island, that in the presence of senator Wilson, of Massa-

chusetts, he told General McDowell, two days before the battle, that the army was not prepared, and ought not to move forward to an engagement; to which McDowell replied, *that if he could not fight now, he could not fight in six months*, because his *best men would go home;* when Burnside said, better fight not at all than fight with his army in its present condition, which remark produced on senator Wilson's face an expression indicating that he thought the colonel to be a coward; *second*, in consideration of the small and insignificant purpose for which the existence of the then entire army of the country was put in jeopardy, to wit, *to break up by destruction of the railroad, the communication between two corps of the enemy.* For the last six weeks, these had both been kept in check and harmless, by the presence of the United States troops, respectively, under General Patterson, on the upper Potomac, and near Washington, under McDowell, and could have been kept in check a great while longer. *This, General McDowell himself, designates the object of the movement*, both at the commencement and towards the end of his report. If the entire army had followed the example of the fourth Pennsylvania volunteers, and of the artillery of the eighth New York militia, the disgrace of July 21st, would probably have been avoided.

Finding General McDowell entirely wanting in the fundamental principles of military foresight, and organizing qualities, as well as in a due consideration of his responsibilities and duties as a commanding general, violating the very rudiments of strategy, to wit, (*that an officer, when attacked, has to defend himself under all circumstances, and at all hazards,* while he *who makes an attack, before he is completely and in every particular fully prepared,* acts the part of a fool); we think we are justified in the expectation that, taking so enormous responsibilities upon himself, in making a forward movement with so badly prepared an army, the general will exercise the utmost care in giving all the necessary orders and instructions, in so precise and perfect a manner that, at least, many of the organic deficiencies of his army may thereby be neutralized. We deeply regret that justice to the various officers who held command under General McDowall, and to their brave soldiers, compel us to say, that the unmilitary orders issued by him, have as much if not more to do with the disastrous result of the affair of Bull Run, than the want of proper organization, drill and preparation of the army before it left Washington. A commanding General when about to go into a battle of his own selection, at his own time and on his own battle field, has nothing to do with his troops on the march towards the battle field; he needs the troops

on the battle field, where he assumes command in person over the entire army, while up to that moment the command and the responsibilities are with the commanders of the various corps. The order of a Commanding General, directing the various corps of his army to move to a certain position, by him designated to each of them respectively, in or near the battle field, ought therefore distinctly to state the time when each corps shall *reach its respective position.* This time alone *can and ought to be fixed by the Commanding General.* It has to be left to the better judgement of the commanders of the various corps, to their intimate knowledge of the character and physique of their troops, of the distance to be marched, of the condition of the roads, and so forth; to determine when they *have to commence* the march for their position on the field, to reach it at the time fixed by the Commanding General. This rule General McDowell has violated in his order to the Commanders of Divisions, in which, instead of fixing the time when the various divisions were respectively to *reach* the positions by him designated to them, he says: *the divisions were ordered to march at half-past two o'clock, A. M., so as to arrive on the ground early in the day and thus avoid the heat.* This order leaves the the time when he wants the troops in their position completely undecided, and takes the responsibilities, the blame for delay in stopping to drink, and all the disorganizing consequences, to which he in his report refers, from the shoulders of the Division Commanders and puts it upon those of General McDowell, who had no right to say in his report that "*the divisions were between two and three hours behind the time appointed.*" He had, according to his own statements, *not appointed any time* at all when *they were to be in position.* These two to three hours behind time, tell fearfully against the General. The unmilitary order for all the divisions to commence the march at the same time, of necessity caused collision and confusion among the various divisions at the outset; exposed the troops on the march to the very heat which was to be avoided, and consequently delayed the commencement, and the termination of the engagement, about three hours beyond the time, when, under a competent General it would have taken place; if he ever had placed himself, under the existing circumstances, in the undesirable position of fighting a battle. These three hours are the very identical few hours, which in General McDowell's own opinion, and according to his statement, in the finishing sentence of his report, *would have secured success to the Union army,* and consequently would have prevented

its destruction It may not be superfluous here to note the fact, that according to General McDowell's report, the frequently talked of rebel fortifications at and near Manassas, had never been reached by any portion of the Union army, and therefore remained as much *terra incognita* after the 21st day of July, 1861, as they had been up to that date.

When the alarm, confusion and consternation caused by the affair at Bull Run had to some extent subsided, and when General McClellan commenced the organization of a new army, General McDowell was put in command of a division of the army on the Potomac, whence he was promoted to the command of a corps d'armee and a Major-General.

Next to the Department of the Rappahannock, and partly belonging thereto, we come to the District of Columbia, over which Brigadier-General James S. Wadsworth was appointed military Governor. The protection, and, in case of emergency, the defence of the City of Washington, with all the important government records and treasure, had been perfected by the construction of some thirty earth works, of more or less strength, mounting in the aggregate a very imposing number of guns, of the heaviest calibre and most improved pattern, and garrisoned by quite a respectable army, composed of infantry, cavalry and mostly of artillery. The circumstance that the regular population of the District was not only considerably increased by the war, that the floating population consists, to a very great extent, in commands and detachments from almost all the regiments that compose the army of the United States, that all these troops, during their sojourn in Washington, are to a greater or smaller extent, placed under the control of the military Governor, makes the office of the last named functionary one of great importance. It can be properly held only by a person of military experience, great tact, sense of justice, and superior executive talent.

Brigadier-General Wadsworth had joined the army under the President's first call for volunteers, with one of the militia regiments of the State of New York; he was promoted a Major, and, as General McDowell says in his report of Bull Run, did that General the honor to be one of his personal staff. When the despair and consternation caused by the Bull Run affair gradually began to give way to a feeling of greater security, and more cheerful expectations, produced by the vigorous manner in which the reorganization of the totally demoralised army by General McClellan was carried on, those persons more or less engaged in Bull Run gradually became visible again in the public places

in and around Washington; many of them considering it unpardonable in General McClellan to insist upon it that the army should be completely organised, armed, equipped, officered and drilled, as well as provided with all the necessary auxilliaries; that *en fine* it should be as different from the so-called army that left Washington to go to Bull's Run as black is from white, before he would lead it against an enemy, (who in addition to the self-reliance and confidence gained by his success at Bull's Run, had erected and manned at and around Manassas Junction numerous fortifications which at the time of the Bull Run disaster were already so formidable that not one man of McDowell's army approached them, and which since that fatal day had been continually extended and strengthened). Among those disapproving of General McClellan's strategy General Wadsworth was prominent, and he is said to have publicly declared that McClellan's army was strong enough at any time to march against and over the rebel fortifications at Manassas whenever that General would say the word forward, and that because McClellan did not go and attack these fortifications he had become his declared enemy.

What opportunities General Wadsworth has had, to form a correct opinion of the strength required by an army to take and march over the Manassas fortifications we do not know. It is well known that neither the latter gentleman nor any other officer of our army had ever seen these fortifications, neither before, at, nor since Bull Run had afforded to General Wadsworth only an opportunity to see the mismanagement, weakness, repulse and panic of an army, but not its strength or its application and success. He had never seen any other army make a successful advance against fortifications of any kind It is the opinion universally expressed in Washington that, (without considering for a moment whether he was a tall a competent judge in military affairs, without recollecting that to speak disrespectfully and with contempt of a superior officer is under the articles of war a serious offence, deserving punishment, and that, as general-in-chief of the army, General McClellan was the superior of Brigadier-General Wadsworth) the latter was among the loudest who accused General McClellan of inactivity, of want of talent, of dash and of military qualification in general, and who used all his influence for the purpose of opposing and crippling the execution of his plans for the campaign of 1862. However self-confident he may have been as to his superior judgment in military affairs regarding *offensive* movements, it seems that the confidence of the President and Secretary of War in his talents and qualification to direct the *defense* of a place

surrounded by fortifications, even at that early part of the campaign, was by no means equal to his own, because his military department was embodied in the Department of the Rappahannock at the very first formation thereof, and the military command vested in General McDowell. The left wing of the army was occupied by the army of the Potomac, leaning with the left on the bank of that river. Major-General George B. McClellan had command of this army, which he himself had organised and in every respect prepared and militarised from its first formation.

It has been so frequently and in so many places, and by so many persons of all political parties, publicly stated—it has never been contradicted, and it therefore can not be doubted—that according to McClellan's plan for the campaign of 1862, the army of the Potomac as well, as the grand army in the West under General Halleck, were not to commence their simultaneous general movements against the rebel forces before the month of April, because it was impossible for the armies to be in every respect completely prepared for the great work laid out for them. That the President, who was completely familiar with McClellan's plan, had fully approved of and sanctioned it; had in the early spring of the year, lost the strength of will to rely upon his own better judgment, and yielding to the opinions of others, had pressed McClellan to deviate from his well-considered plans. The latter (convinced of the disastrous consequences which a yielding against his own well matured conviction would carry with it, and remembering the advice given him by his veteran predecessor, Winfield Scott, in their parting interview at the railroad depot at Washington, "*never to allow himself to be influenced by the opinion of others, against his own deliberate judgment,*" had resisted all the force brought to bear on him, and had refused to order a premature forward movement. That in consequence thereof, McClellan was deprived of the command-in-chief of the army, left in command of the army of the Potomac only; and the new independent Departments were created. McClellan, after having explained and demonstrated all the necessary evil consequences of a forward movement, before the time fixed upon by him; a good soldier as he is, had, when he ceased to be General-in-chief, punctually executed the orders received from the Commander-in-Chief, advanced with the army of the Potomac from Arlington Heights towards Centreville, Manassas and Warrenton, and directed McDowell's corps towards Fredericksburg. He then, with his entire army, except McDowell's corps of four divisions, returned to Alexandria and em-

barked thence for Fortress Monroe and the Peninsula. From April until August, 1862, his army was entirely isolated from the armies of the other Departments in Virginia.

For the complete military history and review of the operations of the army of the Potomac on the Peninsula, we refer our readers to a pamphlet published by H. Dexter, 113 Nassau street, New-York, entitled "Major General George B. McClellan, from August 1861 to August 1862," which gives a lucid history of the services General McClellan has rendered to the country.

Having examined the positions of the different corps of the army in Virginia, designated to them by the President's War Orders, having despatched the army of the Potomac under McClellan to the Peninsula, and having become acquainted with the commanding generals of the various corps, we will now try to find out what military results were to be obtained by the various corps, and how far the commanding generals succeeded in achieving what they were expected to perform.

The main object of the campaign of 1862 in Virginia was to get possession of Richmond; the part, in the execution of this plan, assigned to Generals McDowell, Banks and Fremont, was to gain possession of the Rappahannock river from the Potomac to Fredericksburg; to drive the small rebel force under General Jackson still in the Shenandoah valley, across the Shanandoah, then take possession of Gordonville thereby (destroying the line of communication between Richmond and the Virginia Central Railroad), to secure the double facilities of the Orange and Alexandria and the Richmond and Fredericksburg Railroads for our army supplies of every description, in the advance of a corps of our forces by way of Hanover Court House, to Richmond.

In the execution of this plan General McDowell's corps had been left near Warrenton Junction, whence he moved toward Fredericksburg, while at the same time a few gunboats of the Potomac flotilla passed up the Rappahannock and destroyed a rebel battery near Lowry's Point. A few days later, General McDowell's corps, without meeting any rebel force strong enough to offer resistance to his advance, reached Falmouth, opposite Fredericksburg, on the 18th of April, after the small rebel force had succeeded in destroying the bridge across the river—not, however, with the intention of disputing the passage of the river, but merely to retard the forward movement of the union army, which they of course expected to be intended, because the municipal authorities of Fredericksburg were not prevented from offering to surrender the city upon a guarantee of protection to

private property, which condition was granted by General Huger, the commander of the forces that first reached the place.

General Banks, as soon as he had been vested with the command of the Department of the Shanandoah, went to work to clear it from the enemy. He advanced his troops to the vicinity of Winchester, where, on the 22d day of March, General Shields' division brought on an engagement with the forces under General Jackson, in which General Shields was wounded and put *hors du combat*, by almost the first shell fired against our troops. General Banks, who had been on his way to Washington where he had been summoned, reached the battle-field in time to resume command, and in an engagement of two days, in which the troops of General Jackson were to great advantage placed behind stone fences, whence our army had to drive them at the point of the bayonet, he compelled the rebels to retreat with a considerable loss in killed, wounded and artillery, pursued by the Union army. The position of his troops, under protection of the stone fences, won General Jackson the surname Stonewall, by which, since that time, he has been generally designated. The battle at Winchester was soon followed by one at Strasburg, where Jackson had made a stand; but he had to retreat from here, driven as at Winchester, at the point of the bayonet. He made another stand at Woodstock, but had again to retreat before the cold steel of the Union army. Although he had been considerably reinforced, and although he destroyed all the bridges behind him, and thereby considerably increased the difficulties General Banks had to encounter in his pursuit, nevertheless he had to retreat from Mt. Jackson, from New-Market, and finally from Harrisonburg, after having made a stand, and having been forced in a general engagement of all his forces, to yield every one of these positions to the army under General Banks. From Harrisonburg he retreated toward Staunton, crossed the Shenandoah and destroyed the bridge; thus he prevented General Banks from pursuing him immediately, and he even kept him for a while in ignorance of the direction in which he had withdrawn, leaving the impression on his mind that the rebel army had moved towards Gordonsville. The several battles and engagements above mentioned, and the march from Winchester to Harrisonburg had occupied a period of about six weeks; and after General Banks' corps had driven Jackson from Harrisonburg, and after the latter had crossed the river and destroyed the bridge behind him, there commenced a period of inactivity in General Banks' army which surprised his numerous friends and admirers at the time, but which was explained by subsequent events.

The troops forming the command of Major General John C. Fremont, of the mountain Department, had to be concentrated from various parts of the country. The staff of the Commanding General had to be organized, and the machinery for the management, subsistance and transportation of a *corps d'armee* had to be put in proper working order before the corps could be in condition to take the field with any prospect of success. All these causes operated to the result that while General Banks' corps was gaining victory after victory, the country did not hear of any movements in the mountain department.

General McDowell, after having occupied Fredericksburg, where he found a considerable amount of grain and forage stored by the enemy, had the bridges across the river rebuilt, and put his pickets just beyond the city, so as to be secure against a surprise. At the same time we find him a frequent passenger on the railroad, travelling from Fredericksburg to Washington and back again. Thus time passed on, till General Stonewall Jackson, in retreating before Gen. Banks, crosses the Shenandoah, and leaves that General in doubt as to his exact position. General Banks, who was always with his army and in the saddle, reported to the Secretary of War that Jackson was very near his front, contemplating an attack. General McDowell, who had to divide his time between Fredericksburg and Washington, reported at the same time that he had heard that Jackson was in his front, and he asked for reinforcements, to feel perfectly secure in his position, although he had already a by far larger force than Gen. Banks, although he had not lost anything in battles which he had not fought, while Banks' corps was considerably reduced by losses in the various battles above mentioned. The Secretary of War, was by these contradictory reports, placed in a position actually to direct the movements of armies before the enemy, to become responsible for the success or defeat of the cause of the Union, on the field in question, and for the lives of thousands of brave men. They joined the army in the reasonable expectation of being put under command of experienced military men, but not to be sacrificed by the assumption of the control of armies by a completely unqualified person, a position really embarrassing to a man without military knowledge or experience. It can not surprise anybody that Mr. Stanton's order was exactly the reverse from what it ought to have been. He ordered Gen. Banks, 1st, to send 15,000 men, under Gen. Shields, to reinforce Gen. McDowell, at Fredericksburg; and 2d, with the rest of his troops, 4000 infantry, 1500 cavalry, ten Parrot guns and six smooth bores, to fall back upon Strasburg. In com-

pliance with this order, Gen. Shields had passed safely through Manassas Gap, and joined McDowell; but Col. Kearney, with a Maryland regiment, following over the same route, was intercepted near Front Royal, about ten miles east of Strasbnrg, by Jackson's troops, who had followed in pursuit, the moment he saw the retrogade movement of Gen. Banks, and were badly cut to pieces. Jackson then attacked with his 15,000 men, Gen. Banks, near Strasburg, on the 24th of May, early in the morning, and forced him, in a continuous retreat, over the same route over which he himself had been driven about four weeks ago; and then still further on across the Potomac, which Banks crossed in perfect order, and reached Williamsport, Maryland, May 26th, in the evening. Jackson took about fifty wagons, large quantities of stores, ammunition and uniforms, stored at Winchester; but, thanks to the superior discipline in Banks' corps, thanks to the full confidence of the officers and men in their General, and thanks to the superior combination and good generalship of the commander of the Department of the Shenandoah, Stonewall Jackson did not succeed in taking his entire army prisoners, nor in driving them into the Potomac, and thus destroying them. One or the other he would, in all probability, have accomplished, against a commander not so properly qualified as N. P. Banks. Gen. McDowell, in the meanwhile, remained undisturbed at Fredericksburg, and saw not the ghost of an enemy. This raid of Stonewall Jackson perplexed the Secretary of War completely; he telegraphed to Governor Andrew, of Massachusetts, "the army of Banks is completely routed, and the Capital in danger." Such statements, coming from such a personage, although they were not founded in truth, caused a panic in Wall street, cost the country millions and millions, and spread consternation all over the land. Immediately after this alarming intelligence had produced its effect, the country was given to understand that Banks' retreat had been a mere matter of strategy, that Jackson was bagged in the Shenandoah Valley, and would never get out of it alive. Generals Fremont and McDowell were ordered to move at once and to intercept Jackson's retreat from the valley at all hazards. Both these Generals moved; Gen. Fremont had the misfortune to lead his army wrong, to lose his way, and to arrive at Strasburg on the 2d of June, just in time to be too late to intercept Jackson, who had constructed a rope barricade, across which a large number of Fremont's cavalry stumbled, and were wounded and taken prisoners. Next evening, Fremont came up with the rear guard of Jackson's army, and in connection with Gen. Shields' troops, who had arrived from Fredericks-

burg, and over whom he assumed command had several engagements with the rebels, under command of Ashby, in which the latter had all the advantage, and finally eluded Fremont so completely, that for several days neither Fremont nor Shields, nor McDowell, nor the Secretary of War, had the faintest idea of his whereabouts. All these Generals kept their troops resting on their arms, believing the enemy to be just in front of them. Jackson, meantime, was far away on his way to Hanover Court House, where, after resting and recruiting his army, he made, on the 26th day of June, the attack on the right wing of the Army of the Potomac.

Thus, of all the work laid out to be performed by the commanders of the Departments of the Rappahannock, Shenandoah, and the Mountain Department, nothing whatever had been accomplished; McDowell was still in Fredericksburg, which he had never left, except to go back to Washington. Fremont had accomplished nothing; and Banks, although he had distinguished himself as a commanding general, in the offensive as well as in the retreat, had, by the interference of incompetent superiors, been compelled to abandon the advantages already gained. Mr. Stanton, relying, according to his doctrine in the *Tribune* letter, upon the Spirit of the Lord, upon inspiration, upon the blessing of Providence, and upon Joshua, to organize victories and plan the battles for him, had, of course, utterly failed in the task voluntarily undertaken to control armies in the field by receiving frequent reports from and giving orders to the commanders of independent corps. The necessary co-operation of all or any of the above corps in the advance upon Richmond by the army of the Potomac, which had been solemnly promised, had not even been attempted; the success of that army had thereby been endangered, and the country had suffered enormous in men and means.

In this emergency, the President considered it important to re-establish the unity of command over the corps of McDowell, Banks, and Fremont, which had been destroyed by his War Order No. 3. For that purpose he consolidated them into the army of Virginia, and appointed Major-General John Pope commanding general thereof, June 25th. Fremont to command the first, Banks the second, and McDowell the third army corps of the army of Virginia.

Immediately after the announcement of this appointment, General John C. Fremont sent in the resignation of his command, because he considered his dignity offended by the appointment, as commanding general over him, of an officer whom he out-ranked. His resignation

was accepted, and after the command of the first corps of the army had been tendered to and had been declined by General Rufus King, Major-General Franz Sigel was appointed to that command.

It may not be out of place here to mention that the authority *to appoint a general of lower rank to command over officers out-ranking him*—an authority interfering materially with the universally established military rules, calculated, when exercised, in nine cases out of ten, to cause mischief and ill will, to destroy harmony and cordial co-operation, and thereby to undermine elements essential for the success of any army—that this authority was given to the President by an act of Congress, originating with, and carried principally by the votes of, the friends of General Fremont, with the intention, it was said, to see General McClellan—who would not allow anybody to interfere with his official business—superseded by General Fremont, whom he out-ranked. As if Nemesis had willed it, the first instance in which the President thought himself justified to exercise this dangerous authority, he had to exercise it against General Fremont. How far the step taken by the latter was taken with good grace towards his friends, is a question on which opinions may differ. That General Fremont, as a soldier, in the face of the enemy, at a moment when his country's cause was in danger, when every man was asked and expected to do his whole duty, by act, by encouragement in word and example, acted wrong, unpatriotic, and set a bad example to every officer in the army, even if his resignation had been justifiable by strict interpretation of established military rule—on that point we say there can be but one opinion. Of all the Generals in the army, John C. Fremont was the only one *who had no right to complain of or take umbrage at the exercise of the President's authority to supersede him by a junior officer*, because General Fremont had been deprived of his command on grave charges in October, 1861. The act vesting the President with the above mentioned unexampled authority *had been passed soon after, and was the law of the land.* When, at theurgent solicitations of his friends, the President tendered him the command of the Mountain Department, the General was fully aware of the existence of the act in question, and it was his duty, as a soldier and as a man, at that time, to consider and to decide whether or not, with such an authority in the President's hands, he thought it proper to accept a command in the army? In accepting it, he knowingly and willingly submitted to take his chances of being hurt by the exercise of the President's authority, and waived all his right to complain in case he should be hurt.

Military law considers resignation before the enemy an act of cowardice, and makes no distinction between officers of higher or lower rank. General Pope says on the subject, from Headquarters, Army of Virginia, Warrenton, July 30, 1862: "No resignation of any officer whatever will be accepted, except upon medical certificate of the most conclusive character, or proof of worthlessness; it is therefore to be distinctly understood, that any officer of this army whose resignation has been accepted without medical certificate, has proved himself worthless and incompetent."

When, in consequence of the utter failure of the summer campaign, President Lincoln had called for 300,000 volunteers, when a mass meeting was held in the city of New York, for the purpose of encouraging a hearty response to the President's call, on the 15th of July, 1862, a fortnight after he had resigned his command before the enemy, had set a bad example to every officer, soldier, and patriot, and all that, as we have shown, without any just cause; when he ought to have hidden himself till time had made his act pass from the memory of the people, on that day John C. Fremont, in the uniform of a Major-General, appeared on stand No. 5, Union Square, and made a speech, asking the people to enlist as volunteers, and to sacrifice their lives on the altar of their country—who can wonder that the Government had to resort to a draft?

General John Pope, as a captain in the regular army, was appointed by the War Department one of the officers to escort President Lincoln to Washington. When the rebellion broke out, he was made a brigadier-general, and had a command in Missouri. When General Halleck took command of the department of the Mississippi, he sent Pope with a corps of about 12,000 men, to operate in the rear of New Madrid, while the gunboats made an attack in front; this accomplished, without any resistance by the rebels, General Pope moved farther to the Arkansas line, to assist in the reduction of Island No. 10, in the Mississippi. General Schuyler Hamilton, who had command under him, suggested, as the General states in his report, to cut a canal through the swamp and bayou, for the purpose of sending transports and a gunboat below the island. Colonel Ripley, commanding an engineer regiment, had the canal dug by his men, and General Pope's corps was enabled to embark and cross the river. Some gunboats from above had ran the gauntlet of the enemy's batteries; and could protect the crossing army, against the attack of any rebel craft, sent up from Memphis to the support of Island No. 10. This crossing of the Mississippi, without the loss of a single man either in embarkation

or disembarkation of the troops, although not interfered with by any hostile demonstration, was, nevertheless, a great success. Buteventhis was eclipsed by a still more wonderful performance, next succeeding the disembarkation of Pope's corps on the left bank of the river, to wit, by the capture of some 6,000 rebels on their retreat from the evacuation of Island No. 10, without firing a shot. When General Halleck concentrated his army for the purpose of besieging Corinth, General Pope's command became part of the besieging force, and entered Corinth with the rest, after Beauregard's army had evacuated the place. This accomplished, active operation of the grand army of the West came to a stand-still. Almost all the generals holding command therein (with the exception of Generals Buell and Grant, who always remained with their troops), proceeded to the city of Washington, for purposes best known to themselves. Thus General Pope happened to be in Washington when the President needed somebody to bring unity in the operations of the three army corps above mentioned. He was promoted a major-general, and appointed to the command of the newly-created army of Virginia.

The achievements of General Pope out West appearing to great advantage—for distance lends enchantment to the view—but by no means indicating any qualification for a command of an army against an enemy, had, nevertheless, the effect, that his appointment to the command of the army of Virginia, was generally considered as a proper one.

On the fourteenth day of July, General Pope issued the following order to the officers and soldiers af the army of Virginia:

WASHINGTON, *July* 14, 1862.

TO THE OFFICERS AND SOLDIERS OF THE ARMY OF VIRGINIA:

By special assignment of the President of the United States, I have assumed the command of this army.

I have spent two weeks in learning your whereabouts, your condition, and your wants; in preparing you for active operations, and in placing you in positions from which you can act promptly and to the purpose.

I have come to you from the West, where we have always seen the backs of our enemies, from an army whose business it has been to seek the adversary, and to beat him when found, whose policy has been attack, and not defense.

In but one instance has the enemy been able to place our Western armies in a defensive attitude.

I presume that I have been called here to pursue the same system, and to lead you against the enemy.

It is my purpose to do so, and that speedily.

I am sure you long for an opportunity to win the distinction you are capable of achieving. That opportunity I shall endeavor to give you.

Meantime, I desire you to dismiss from your minds certain phrases which I am sorry to find so much in vogue among you.

I hear constantly of taking strong positions and holding them—of lines of retreat and bases of supplies. Let us discard such ideas.

The strongest position a soldier should desire to occupy, is one from which he can most easily advance against the enemy.

Let us study the probable lines of retreat of our opponents, and leave our own to take care of themselves.

Let us look before, and not behind.

Success and glory are in the advance.

Disaster and shame lurk in the rear,

Let us act on this understanding, and it is safe to predict that your banners shall be inscribed with many a glorious deed, and that your names will be dear to your countrymen forever.

JOHN POPE,
Major-General Commanding.

This order fell like a thunder-clap upon the mind of all reflecting persons, but in particular upon military men.

Proper conduct under all, even the most difficult and perplexing circumstances, is one of the fundamental and indispensible requirements for an officer, of whatever rank, but in particular for an officer commanding a corps or an army, so much so that *conduct unbecoming an officer* is one of the gravest charges to be brought against him. To what extent proper conduct of an officer is required, may be best illustrated by the proceedings of a Court-Martial, held in New York in reference to charges preferred against the officer commanding the United States forces, embarked in New York, on board the steamer San Francisco, shipwrecked, and rescued by the captain of the British ship Three Bells.

An officer who lacks proper conduct, in the most ordinary affairs of life, is not qualified for, and is unreliable in, any command, but in particular is he utterly disqualified for command of an army. General Pope's order of June 14, 1862, is improper from beginning to end. The second sentence is, to say the least, discourteous to Generals McDowell, Banks, and Fremont, because it insinuates that these generals, although in the field for some months, had left their armies *unprepared for active operations*, and had kept them in positions from which they could not *act promptly or to the purpose.* Sentences three, four, five, six, seven and eight, contain nothing but self-conceit

and bravado. Our armies in the West would not deserve the credit for gallantry, for which they are justly distinguished, if they *had always seen the backs of the enemy*—that is, if the enemy had always run away. It is a peculiar fact that at New Madrid, and at Island No. 10, General Pope had to operate in the rear of the enemy, and therefore only saw their backs, while others saw the enemy's face. At Corinth he saw Beauregard's back, but at a great distance, inasmuch as the latter had marched nine miles with his main army before Halleck occupied the place. Sentences nine, ten, eleven, twelve, thirteen, fourteen and fifteen, in imitation of Mr. Stanton's *Tribune* letter, contain a slur on General McClellan, General Pope's superior in rank; an officer who, at the time when the latter, in his order, forgot his duty to a brother officer, had led his army to beard the lion in his own den, had taken Yorktown, had won the battles of Williamsburg and Fair Oaks, and had never met with a single defeat. These sentences express opinions in open contradiction to the very fundamental principles of strategy in general, and to the revised army regulations of 1861, in particular. Principles, the violation of which caused the disasters at Belmont to Generals Grant and McClernand; while, by the strict adherence to them, Beauregard saved his army at Bowling Green, at Columbus, at Island No. 10, and at Corinth, although at every one of these places, our generals predicted his capture. Principles which no soldier has ever violated without being severely punished for it. That a commander, proclaiming the principles contained in this order, could never fulfil the predictions contained in its closing sentences, is not to be wondered at.

Ten days after the above mentioned order had astonished the country, General Pope issued, on the 26th of July, the following:

HEAD-QUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,
WASHINGTON, *July* 26, 1862.

Captain Samuel L. Harrison, of the Ninety-Fifth Regiment of New York volunteers, is reported by his commanding general as having deserted his company on the 21st of this month, and gone to New York. A reward of five cents is offered for his apprehension.

By order of MAJOR-GENERAL POPE.
GEORGE D. RUGGLES, Chief of Staff.

This order is unmilitary, and a palpable violation of the revised army regulations of 1861, which, in sections 20, 24, and 50, direct a commander how to catch, how to try, and how to punish a deserter. They are just as binding to the general commanding, as they are to the youngest drummer-boy in the army. It is a

premeditated insult offered by General Pope to all officers of the army, as a class,—an insult, that in any other army would cause the general either to be court-martialed and cashiered, or to be shot at by every officer as long as there was anything left of him (Gen. Pope). Some six years ago, for an expression, by far less insulting than the order in question, *Lieutenant-General* Von Plehwe was shot dead by *Second* lieutenant Von Jachman, in a duel fought under the sanction of the *Council of Honor*, every member of the council being present at the duel. The *Court of Honor* who tried the case, honorably acquitted the principal, the seconds, and every member of the *Council of Honor*, from a violation of the laws against duelling; and the King of Prussia, to whose army both the combatants belonged, although he referred the verdict of the first *Court of Honor* successively to two different courts, did not succeed in having the same materially amended. Not until every officer in our army, high or low in rank, recognizes in every other officer a brother in arms, whom he treats as such, and whose honor is as sacred to him as his own (till by his conduct he forfeits this recognition and thereby his commission), not until then can we expect our army to be raised to its fullest discipline and military efficiency.

The President, for reasons best known to himself, on the 11th day of August, immediately on his return from a visit to the army of the Potomac at Harrison's Landing, appointed Major General Halleck General-in-Chief of the Army of the United States, and his arrival in Washington was daily expected. General Pope, nevertheless, thought proper, without awaiting this arrival, which took place July 22d, to issue, July 18th, the following Orders No. 5 and 6:

General Order—No. 5.

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF VIRGINIA,
Washington, July 18, 1862.

Hereafter, as far as practicable, the troops of this command will subsist upon the country in which their operations are carried on. In all cases supplies for this purpose will be taken by the officers to whose department they properly belong, under the orders of the commanding officers of the troops for whose use they are intended. Vouchers will be given to the owners, stating on their face that they will be payable at the conclusion of the war, upon sufficient testimony being furnished that such owners have been loyal citizens of the United States since the date of the vouchers. Whenever it is known that supplies can be furnished in any district of the country where the troops are to operate, the use of trains for carrying subsistence will be dispensed with as far as possible.

By command of Major General POPE.

GEORGE D. RUGGLES, Colonel, A. A. G. and Chief of Staff.

General Order—No. 6.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF VIRGINIA,
Washington, July 18, 1862.

Hereafter, in any operations of the cavalry forces in this command, no supply or baggage trains of any description will be used, unless so stated specially in the order for the movement. Two days' cooked rations will be carried on the persons of the men, and all villages or neighborhoods through which they pass will be laid under contribution in the manner specified by general order No. 5, current series for these headquarters, for the subsistence of men and horses. Movements of cavalry must always be made with celerity, and no delay in such movements will be excused hereafter on any pretext.

Whenever the order for the movement of any portion of this army emanates from these headquarters, the time of marching, and that to be consumed in the execution of the duty, will be expressly designated, and no departure therefrom will be permitted to pass unnoticed, without the gravest and most conclusive reasons. Commanding officers will be held responsible for strict and prompt compliance with every provision of this order.

By command of Major General POPE.
GEO. D. RUGGLES, Colonel, A. A. G. and Chief of Staff.

The rebel government retaliated by declaring that whenever General Pope or any of his officers should be taken prisoners, they should not be treated as prisoners of war, but should be put in close confinement and be hanged. In his army this order caused so much lawless conduct that General Pope found himself under the necessity to issue another order, August 14th, amending the previous one, in conformity with an order on the same subject, issued August 9th, by General McClellan. All these orders having been launched, General Pope finally left the city of Washington to join his army in the field, July 26th, 1862. Before this change of quarters he had ordered a movement by a part of his army under General Hatch, which resulted in a *report* all over the country, that he had taken possession of the town of Gordonsville, Va., a point of the highest strategical importance to the rebels. When the truth of the matter became known, Gordonsville had not been seen; on the contrary, for want of proper instructions, an important bridge on the road thereto had been destroyed by our own men, and thereby had been converted into protection for the rebels against an attack from us, and into an obstacle to our progress in the proper direction.

The idea of gaining possession of Gordonsville (which at the time the first movement of Pope's army took place was occupied only by an insignificant rebel force, and might easily have been taken by a bold dash) seems to us, to be one of the principal causes of the disas-

trous results of the short campaign between the Rappahannock and the Potomac. Having failed to accomplish in July what at that time ought to have been done, General Pope did not take into proper consideration that the moment the movement of General Hatch was reported to Richmond, a force sufficient to hold Gordonsville was despatched to protect it, and to defeat all and any of Pope's operations in that direction. The commander of the rebel forces, entrusted with the execution of this order, was too good a soldier to remain idle at Gordonsville, when, on his arrival there, he found the Union army still spread over a vast territory, and far on the opposite side of the Rapidan. He intended to keep Pope as far away from his "pasture grounds" as possible. He therefore occupied and strongly posted himself at and near Cedar Mountain, keeping Robin's creek in front, and surrounding on three sides a narrow plateau intersected by "Cedar Spring creek," and by two roads leading to Culpepper Court House and Sperryville. Into this plateau, which formed an elongated circle segment, the base towards the Union army and about a mile in length, General Pope, on the 9th day of August, sent the corps of General Banks, which, as we have seen, he had drawn from the Shanandoah valley, with instructions to hold this position while he himself, with General McDowell, remained at Culpepper, some seven miles distant, ordering Sigel with his corps from Sperryville also to move to Culpepper. Banks had hardly taken position when the rebels opened upon him from both flanks and in front, with heavy artillery, placed in masked positions on a high elevation, which at the same time commanded the *only two bridges over Cedar creek, in his rear*, over which he could retreat, or over which succor could reach him (see map of battle field). The General saw at once that to stand on the defensive would be destruction by the enemy's cross-fire; to retreat would only hasten this destruction, in the attempt to pass the two bridges above mentioned. A brave, intelligent soldier, and a skillful commander, he at once adopted the only plan which gave a chance of success, that is, to dislodge the enemy from his strong position by attacking it. With fearful loss he gradually succeeded, by the brilliant gallantry of his troops, to force the enemy into a retrogade movement. In the evening General Pope appeared at the battle field, followed by Sigel's and part of McDowell's corps, to within about two miles of the battle field, and for the first time discovered that the battle field was so narrow, and the roads leading to it so few, that it was impossible to move fresh troops forward and withdraw Banks' corps; Gen. Banks had to fight it out to the bitter end with his ex

hausted troops, although some 20,000 men stood within a short distance of him eager, but unable to march to his assistance, because Pope had sent him in to a bag. Night terminated the slaughter; the rebels withdrew a short distance to a near mountain ridge; Banks occupied the position in which he had first been attacked, and apparently both parties attended to their dead and wounded. We say apparently, because the rebels saw at once that with the concentration of the corps of Banks, Sigel and McDowell, at and near Cedar Mountain, Gen. Pope had left open to them their old highway in the Shenandoah Valley. They, therefore, left a comparatively small force, it is said, under command of Ewell, on the Rapidan, and between Sperryville and Culpepper, to entertain Pope's army, to advance or to retreat as occasion may require, but under all circumstances to keep him there as long as possible, and to hang on his heels in case he should retreat. Gen. Burnside, who had joined McClellan's army after the seven days' battle, had landed at Acquia Creek, and joined Pope. McClellan, with the entire Army of the Potomac, had left Harrison's Landing almost on the same day on which Banks distinguished himself at Cedar Mountain, by saving a part of his army, in a position selected by Pope, where, in nine cases out of ten, his entire corps would be destroyed. The rebel leaders were thereby relieved of all anxiety about the safety of their own capital. This movement, from a military point of view, by whomsoever it may have been ordered, must be considered one of the greatest strategical blunders during the entire campaign. For a large army, the only military line of approach to Richmond, is the line of the James River; the line by Fredericksburg we consider a military impossibility, on account of the constant destruction by the rebels of the line of communication, and on account of the impossibility to support a large army at so great a distance from a *water base.*

Napoleon, when, contrary to his well matured plan to go into winter quarters at Wilna, he advanced into the interior of the enemy's country, towards Moscow, overlooked this very difficulty. The impossibility to protect, in the enemy's country, a line of communication a hundred miles or more in length, and in consequence thereof the almost incessant attacks of the French army by Cossacks, who swarmed around them like bees; destroyed every bridge, thereby retarding his march beyond all calculation, made his retreat one of unparallelled disaster, almost annihilation, compared with which, the effect of the climate alone upon the army, in unobstructed rapid marches, would have been insignificant. The

rebel cavalry, under General Stuart, we fear, would be the Cossacks to any army that will march from Washington via Fredericksburg, to Richmond.

This impossibility alone, justifies Gen. Halleck in not following Beauregard when he retreated from Corinth. Halleck's army was then the largest Union army ever concentrated in the field; it had had no battle since Pittsburg Landing, was in fine condition, was well supplied with everything necessary, had experience and success on his side; while the rebel army had nothing to show but want, retreats and reverses. The impossibility of supporting so large an army as his in the enemy's exhausted country, away from a water base, forced the General to allow Beauregard to move wherever he saw fit to go, to rest, to recruit, and to reinforce Richmond in time for the battles against the Army of the Potomac, which army would have been destroyed, had not General McClellan, by his genius, by his energetic movements, his gallantry, dash, and military excellence, triumphed over the combined talent and bravery of the rebel leaders and their armies. The same reasons that prevented General Halleck from following Beauregard's army on their way from Corinth to Richmond, prevent the movement of a large army from Washington, by way of Fredericksburg, for the occupation of Richmond. Relieved on the James River of the army of the Potomac, (which reached Alexandria soon after the middle of August, and was, in its single corps and divisions, separately assigned to the army of Virginia under General Pope, so that McClellan had hardly a corporal's guard left him,) the rebels sent a large army under General Lee, by way of Gordonsville and Staunton, in the Shenandoah Valley, thence to Manassas Gap, and through Thoroughfare Gap by way of Bull Run and Centerville to Washington. This road to the national Capitol, upon which the rebel army had been moving, more than once during the war, had been left completely unprotected by General Pope. He had marched according to his ideas of *concentration*, placed his entire army in a small corner of his department, and carried his horrors of looking to the rear, so far as not even to dare to look to his flanks. He had, without the least idea of a reserve corps, or of the safety of Washington, pending battles in close proximity, drawn the entire force under Burnside, and almost the entire army of the Potomac, into the same narrow compass of his strategy, in which they had several engagements, all of them terminating unfavorably for the Union army, the reports of his brilliant victories to the contrary notwithstanding. At the eleventh hour, (after

General Lee had, by a cavalry expedition under General Stuart, which captured Pope's tent and all its contents, convinced himself, that his road was perfectly clear from Pope's soldiers;) a fortunate accident placed General Pope in possession of a letter from General Lee, containing his orders for the movement on Washington, above mentioned. He now tried to dispute the passage of Thoroughfare Gap, by sending a corps to that place, but it is too late; the rebels force the passage, and Pope actually finds a portion of Lee's army between himself and Washington; fortunately, the rebel corps was too small to resist the combined forces under Pope, and he succeeded in placing his army again between Washington and the enemy, but only to be attacked and driven from position to position, during five days almost uninterrupted fighting. Gainsville, Manassas Junction, the old battle field of Bull Run, Centerville, and Fairfax Court House, are in quick succession the scenes, not of well devised battles, but of a rough and tumble fight, in which, on their retreat towards Washington the Union army of heroes is destroyed in consequence of the total incapacity of their Commanding General; till on the third day of September, they are forced to seek protection in the almost ungarrisoned fortifications constructed by McClellan in front of Washington. The enemy, in close proximity to the National Capital, with Maryland and Pennsylvania at their mercy, is halting to decide in what direction to advance.

The more intelligent the rank and file of an army, the more accomplished ought to be their officers. The better disciplined an army, the more it will suffer in the hands of an incompetent general. Armies experienced in actual warfare, require the most precise orders from their leaders. These are well established military truisms. Pope's deplorable August campaign, fully demonstrates their correctness. The troops under General McDowell had before this campaign hardly seen any active service; the men did not understand to distinguish a judicious movement from a fatal one; they were tumbled about from one place to another, without knowing why nor caring what for.

The troops under Generals Banks and Sigel had seen considerable service under their able commanders, and were well disciplined; they very soon perceived the total want of a proper plan and purpose in, the movements undertaken by General Pope; at the outset they had, relying on competent leadership, executed every movement as ordered and consequently had suffered in a fearful manner; Banks left without any orders at Brestow, when General Pope commenced his re-

treat, was actually surrounded by the enemy and had to cut his way through to reach Fairfax Court House; Sigel, who was placed in the advance as long as the army faced the enemy, and had to cover the retreat, when General Pope began to look in the rear,—did not hesitate, it is said, to express his opinion of the total incompetence of that gentleman, and to call to strict account General McDowell, who by the want of General Pope's better judgment was for a time placed in command over Major-General Sigel, while Brigadier-General Reno had an independent command of a corps.*

The generals and troops of the army of the Potomac, gradually all placed under the command of General Pope, had by long experience under General McClellan, learned to understand that every movement of a Division or Corps forms part of a well-digested and completely matured plan of operations, and that the orders for the execution thereof were concise in every respect. These troops under men like Hooker, Heintzleman, Sumner, Fitzjohn Porter, Griffin, Franklin, Kearney and Stephens—every one of them the hero of a hard fought battle—at first went into action under General Pope, with the same cheerfulness that led them victorious through all dangers on the Peninsula, but they very soon found they had a commander without a head and became dissatisfied.

The newspapers, on the 15th day of October, published the following letter, said to have been addressed on the 4th day of August, by

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*To place General McDowell in battle over General Sigel, is to put the horse upon the rider. If General Pope had not been completely blinded by his self-conceit he would have taken advantage of his good luck to have a man like Sigel in his army; he would have given to that officer, the de facto command of the army of Virginia, while he and McDowell in the meanwhile might have taken the best possible care of themselves, sent despatches of brilliant victories to Washington and finally might have reaped all the glory. We regret that General Sigel has thought it proper, in time of war, on one or more occasions to make a political speech, but nevertheless we are forced to express our conviction, that of all the officers in the army of Virginia the only one capable to save that army from utter ruin, after the enemies' advance had passed Thoroughfare Gap, is Franz Sigel. In him the advantages of the most thorough military education and extensive experience as a commander are combined, with the rare gift of military genius, unsurpassed bravery, energy, and a bull-dog tenacity. These qualities he displayed in his celebrated retreats from Carthage and from Rolla, as well as at the battle of Pea Ridge, when holding command under a general of inferior capacities, he had to force upon that gentleman a complete victory over the rebel army when a surrender to the latter, was in that strategist's opinion the only chance for him. He displayed those qualities also in the three days' engagements on the Rapidan, after the affair of Cedar Mountains, where with a small corps he successfully disputed the crossing of that river by the rebels till he was ordered to move according to Pope's directions with McDowell.

Major-General Kearney, of the army of the Potomac, to a Mr. Halstead of New Jersey:

HARRISON'S LANDING, August 4, 1862.

DEAR PET—I thank you for your kind, long letter. You extend to me hope. You suggest withdrawing me and my division from this ignoble position. With Pope's army I would breathe again.

We have no generals. McClellan is the failure I ever proclaimed him. He has been punished, just as I at once comprehended the moves of the parties. He will only get us in more follies, more waste of blood, fighting by driblets. He has lost the confidence of all. Nor has he a single officer about him capable of bettering us. Sumnor is a "bull in a china shop," and a sure enough blunderer. ——— lest his corps gratuitously at Fair Oaks. He is not now in his right place, and will be much worse. ——— is a small brain, ossified in a "4 company" garrison on the frontier. He was not "of us" in Mexico, but in a rear column once saw a distant flash in a guerilla fight. His skill is a myth, a poetical version of his own part at Bull Run. Porter is good in nature, but weak as water—the parent of all this disaster for his want of generalship on the Chickahominy. ——— and Franklin are talented engineers. They might make good generals if they understood the value of elements in their calculations; as it is, they are dangerous failures.

When ——— was drunk he had some few men drowned before Yorktown. I know of no other feat of his. Franklin's battle of West Point was a most runaway picket fight of ours. His part on the Chickahominy was unpardonable. He sent over a division (his own), was present on that side out of fire, and never interfered to protect them from being sacrificed by driblets and rendered a prey to their false position. I was horrified at it, as described by General Taylor and all others. Is it surprising that I want to get out of this mess? Besides, they have sent me a major generalship, like all these others, dated from 4th July, muddled in a batch of new and very ordinary junior officers. Do they forget that I was appointed twelfth on the original list? that I, on the heels of Bull Run, faced the enemy with a Jersey brigade in advance of all others, against all. McClellan, McDowell, *et id omne genus*, nearly forcing me to come back of the "Seminary." Do they forget me at Manassas? My Jersey brigade that infected with panic the retiring enemy? Has Williamsburg never come to their ears? Oh, no! I really feel aggravated beyond endurance. Discipline becomes degradation if not wielded with justice. Patriotism cannot, amid all her sacrifices, claim that of self respect. Generals, victorious in the past, are not called on to expose their troops, unless those brave men are acknowledged. Their identity in their chief's promotion claims a date of their own high acts. Oh, no, I am nearer returning to the home I have given up, to the interests I have sacrificed, to my cherished wife, whose anxiety oppresses me, than I ever dreamt of in a war for the Union. But if the infatuate North are weak enough to let this crisis be managed by "small men of small motives," I am not willing to be their puppet.

My dear Pet, I am too lazy, and too little interested to dive into the future of this "little box of heresies," so do tell me—what do the people at the North look forward to in the future? I fear lest this war will die out in rapid imbecility.

For McClellan, he is burnt out. Never once on a battle field, you have nothing to hope from him as a leader of a column. How do they expect Pope to beat, with a very inferior force, the veterans of Ewell and Jackson? But these are episodes. We deceive ourselves. There was a people of old—it was the warrior Spartan, with his Helot of the fields. The South have realized it. There was an ambitious people of recent times, and a conscription pandered to her invasions. At this moment the South exemplifies them both. "Peace, peace!" but there is no peace. No, not even with a disruptured Union. Let the North cast away that delusion.

Draft we must, or the disciplined thousands of the South will redeem scrip in Philadelphia; and yet the true North must accept it, and quickly, to a man, or the moment it draggles in debate Maryland, Tennessee, and Kentucky will cast past victories to the winds, and rise with their nearly allied rebel kin. My dear Pet, I shall be delighted when Henry can come on. As to Colonel Halstead, I think that his case is a type of the insane and unnecessary despotism introduced into the army under the auspices of McClellan and his very weak aids. It is now too late, but why was not the cavalry put in my charge at the commencement? Two nights ago the rebel batteries fired from across the river, and killed and wounded some thirty men. Last night Hooker started on a crude expedition to Malvern Hills. He went out four miles and came back again. Still, a "false fuss" injures the whole army. McClellan is dangerous, from the want of digesting his plans. He positively has no talents. Adieu. Get me and my "fighting division" with Pope. With best regards, yours KEARNEY.

This document, dated Harrison's Landing, commences Dear Pet; it speaks of a mutual friend as Henry; shows thereby great intimacy between the writer and the Dear Pet, but it is nevertheless signed very formal—"Kearney"—not your Philip, as everybody would expect from Dear Pet's intimate friend. The writer says, How do they expect Pope to beat, with a very inferior force, the veterans of Ewell and Jackson? How could Kearney know, on the 4th of August, at Harrison's Landing, first, that the army of Virginia, under Pope, was very inferior to the veterans under Ewell and Jackson, when Pope reports he had 32,000 men at Cedar Mountain? and how did he know that either of these generals, or both of them, would have to be fought by Pope? when at that date, five days before the battle of Cedar Mountain, not even General Pope had the least idea of the strength opposed to him, nor of the name of their commander, and does in his report thereof not mention the name of the rebel

general? The letter continues: "Peace, peace," but there is no peace. Let the North cast away this delusion. All the rumors of peace propositions, and the talk about peace in the rebel Congress, as well as the peace speculations at the North occurred when the rebel army was in Maryland in the early part of September, after General Kearney had died on the battle-field. The names of several officers alluded to in the letter are omitted, while those of the greater number, and in particular of those most unscrupulously criticised, are written in full.

The letter, in its tendencies condemning everybody except the author; complaining of want of proper appreciation of his superiority over everybody; and requesting the friend to get him more power and into a higher rank; resembles very much the letter addressed to a friend by General Shields, immediately after the battle of Winchester, against Jackson, March 22d, 1862.

For these reasons, we doubt the letter in question to be a genuine one, written by Major-General Kearney.

If, nevertheless, Major-General Kearney has written this identical letter to Mr. Halstead, we think the general must, at the time, have been laboring under partial insanity. According to all we have ever heard of him—we did not know him ourselves—he was a gentleman of education; an officer who had travelled in Europe, and held a commission in the French army with credit to himself and to his country. He had, consequently, occasion to associate with French officers, and become familiar with the rules of strictest propriety governing the conduct of comrades-in-arms towards each other; to learn the utter contempt in which an officer would be held who should express opinions discreditable to any other officer, behind his back, to a third person, and has had occasion to form an opinion of the military qualifications of a general. An officer, possessing these advantages, in his right mind, could never forget himself so far as to write a long epistle, touching on almost all the leading topics of the day, for the sole purpose of defaming the commanding general of the army wherein he holds a command, as well as every general in that army who has ever been mentioned with distinction, glorifying only himself and General Pope. Pope at that time, had never had occasion to show what he could do as the leader of an army, but had written a highly improper proclamation to the army of Virginia, and was known to have been exceedingly erratic in his reports as to the capture by him of a large portion of Beauregard's army on their retreat from Corinth, and as to the occupation of Gordonsville. Nor could his extensive

experience have left him, at his time of life, so miserable a judge of the qualifications of a commanding officer, and of his own best interest, as to prefer a command under the unmilitary, self-conceited, in every respect disqualified officer, General Pope has proved himself to be, instead of one under the experienced, gifted, dignified and successful commander of the army of the Potomac, and with his distinguished commanders of corps and of divisions, who had shared with General Kearney the dangers and privations as well as the glory of many a hard-fought battle.

Gen. Pope's report of his campaign, of Sept. 3d, '62, (it does not say where the headquarters of the Army of Virginia are,) is a document in keeping with his proceedings since he was, to his and the country's misfortune, put in command of the Army of Virginia. He tries to convince the General-in-Chief, (who ought to know best what were the objects to be gained by the Army of Virginia, and what instructions he had given to the commander thereof), that he committed this continuous line of military blunders for the purpose of saving the Army of the Potomac from destruction, on the James River; while in all the battles except that on the 9th of August, at Cedar Creek, a smaller or larger part of that army was fighting under his command; while the heaviest fighting was done by these corps, and while the almost complete destruction of the Army of the Potomac, (which counts the gallant Kearney and General Stephens among those thousands who, with their lives, sealed the devotion of that noble army to the Government and the flag of the Union,) is one of the greatest losses the country has had to suffer from Gen. Pope's utter failure as a commander.* He finds fault with Gen. Fitz John Porter, Gen. Griffin and others, and has not a word of thanks for Gen. Sigel, while he insinuates that Gen. McClellan has acted wrong in requesting him to send a proper escort for forage, ammunition and provisions, which he had asked for from the latter. McClellan, as we have mentioned, had no troops left him, but would, according to army regulations, have been held responsible, and justly so, for the careless imprudence of sending government stores over routes everywhere harrassed by the enemy, without proper escort. His orders for the movements of troops are in some instances as unmilitary as those of Gen. McDowell, at Bull Run No. 1.

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*He censures everybody, either direct or by implication; he complains that others have not directed the movements of the Army of Virginia, in his own department, to positions which he had neglected to occupy; he omits dates, which of course confuses his report; he repeats statements said to have been made to him, while he has to admit that he knew them from his own knowledge to be false; he appeals to his countrymen to judge of his military qualifications.

The management of the Army of Virginia by Pope, and the unpardonable reckless mismanagement of the entire campaign, calls to mind Napoleon's well known opinion in regard to an army of lions commanded by a quadruped distinguished for the length of his ears. At the same time we cannot well fail to see how quick retribution has overtaken the man who, in his first proclamation to the army dared to cast a slur at Gen. McClellan; who boasted he had only seen the backs of the enemy, and who promised his army the inscription of many names of glorious battles upon their colors. His neglect of selecting a strong position, and of protecting his line of retreat, and his policy to order his army to live upon the country and to dispense with means of transportation; in fact his utter ignorance and self-conceit have cost the country thousands of valuable lives, millions of treasure, an entire campaign, have drawn the rebel army across the Potomac into Maryland, and have cheated the gallant soldiers of the honorable reward for all their fatigues, dangers and privations, the inscription on their colors of the name of a new Union victory. In his official report, over his own signature, he is forced to express thanks to the corps of the Army of the Potomac, and he has to declare that he had no chance left him but to retreat or to starve.

A colonel of the army, dangerously wounded, writes a letter to his family, declaring *he was dying a victim to the ignorance of Pope and the treachery of McDowell.* Gen. McDowell took occasion to request the President to order a court of investigation in this matter; this request, in our opinion, ought to have been made to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, at whose hands it probably would have received proper attention; the President, we apprehend, will not be able to take any notice thereof.

On the day on which the defeated army of Gen. Pope reached the fortifications in front of Washington, he was relieved of his command; not dismissed from the army, but ordered to take command of the department west of the Mississippi.

When the Government at Washington, by the not very distant roar of cannon, and by the appearance of the rebel scouts near the Chain Bridge, was informed that all the reports of brilliant victories, sent in by Gen. Pope, had not arrested the advance of Robert Lee's army to almost within speaking distance of Arlington Heights, and that the chances of his coming still nearer were rather alarming, it seemed a matter of utmost necessity and of personal safety, (even before Gen. Pope would reach Washington, to be deprived of his command,) to

find an officer competent to defend the National Capital against occupation by the rebels.

General James S. Wadsworth was, to be sure, still Military Gov ernor of the District of Columbia, and nominally held command of all the fortifications around the city of Washington. He was entitled to the command—*de facto*—and we have no doubt he was ready and eager to assume it, if only to prove that he did not hold a sinecure; but we have not learned that at this most critical time of Mr. Lincoln's administration General Wadsworth was ever thought of as the man for that command. It is said it was tendered to General Ambrose Burnside, who in declining its acceptance declared General McClellan to be the best qualified man to save the capital, which reply proved Burnside's ambition subordinate to his patriotism, and the General to be a real hero. Other Generals were consulted; they all pointed to McClellan as the only man for the crisis; General Halleck, invited to attend a cabinet meeting, is said to have been asked how many combinations there were under existing circumstances for the government to decide upon? to which he replied, there were but two; either to have Stonewall Jackson in Washington or to place McClellan in command of all that was left of the armies, because he alone could stem the rebel advances. Finally the President went to see the man who had just returned from a six months' summer campaign, in a southern climate, who had shared with his soldiers the bodily fatigues, the privations and the dangers of battles, while his brain had been constantly working for the benefit of every man in his command; from a campaign where his success had been prevented by nonfulfillment of promises made him by the Administration. The President had to see the man whom a few days ago he had stripped of his command, the man whom almost that very day, persons in the confidence of the Administration had accused of treasonable intentions. He had to see the man who had been publicly sneered at by the Secretary of War and by General Pope, both of them enjoying the President's confidence; the man who under all these circumstances had never uttered a word of complaint or of retaliation, who had strictly attended to his duties and had left the rest with God. How great that man of small stature must then have appeared to the President!

All that was said during this interview will probably not be made known until the memoirs of General McClellan, one of these days, shall appear in print; because the President can not very well have any reason to make it known and McClellan has proved that he never talks. There can be no doubt that Gen-

eral McClellan, who well knew that no power on earth could *compel* him to resume command after the treatment he had received at the hands of Mr. Lincoln's administration, had promises made him that he should promptly receive for his army all they needed, and that he should hereafter not be interfered with by anybody.

Time alone can show how such promises are carried out while Edward M. Stanton remains Secretary of War.

On the 2d day of September General McClellan was appointed to command the fortifications around Washington, and all the troops for the defence of the Capital, which meant of all that remained of the armies of Virginia, of the Potomac, and Burnside's forces. On the same day McClellan went into Virginia to visit the troops; his very presence electrified and invigorated them; on the 4th of September he issued the following General Order:

GENERAL ORDERS—No. 1.

WASHINGTON, Sept. 4, 1862.

First—Pursuant to General Orders No. 122 from the War Department, Adjutant-General's office, of the 2d inst., the undersigned hereby assumes command of the fortifications of Washington and of all the troops for the defense of the Capital.

Second—The heads of the staff departments of the Army of the Potomac will be in charge of their respective departments at these headquarters.

Third—In addition to the consolidated morning reports required by the circular of this date from these headquarters, reports will be made by corps commanders as to their compliance with the assignment to positions heretofore given them, stating definitely the ground occupied and covered by their commands, and as to what progress has been made in obedience to the orders already issued to place their commands in condition for immediate service.

G. B. McCLELLAN, Major-General.

S. WILLIAMS, Assistant Adjutant-General.

which will bear comparison with the first order of General Pope to the Army of Virginia, on account of the pen and ink portraits it furnishes, of the two men.

The army of the Potomac had suffered great losses during the seven days' battle, which had never been made good. The two weeks' campaign with Pope had greatly reduced its already small numbers, and had cost it many valuable officers; nevertheless Gen. McClellan made this army the nucleus around which to group the corps that were now, for the first time, placed under his command, as well as the new volunteers which had, to some extent, reached Washington. He himself, Burnside, Sigel, Banks, the commanders of corps and of divisions, the chiefs of the various departments of his

army, and his entire staff, were at work day and night. The confusion, the disorganization, and the demoralization in which the army had returned to Washington soon disappeared, and discipline, order, and cheerfulness became again the order of the day. Fabulous as it may appear, it is nevertheless true that overcoming all obstacles and difficulties in his way, and infusing his own zeal, determination, and perseverance into every one with whom he came in contact, McClellan succeeded in organizing a proper garrison in the fortifications around Washington, for the safety of the capital, over which he placed General Banks in command; two corps to co-operate with the latter in Virginia, under General Heintzleman and General Sigel; and on the 8th day of September he left Washington with an army of about 65,000 men, to meet General Robert Lee, who had sent one of his corps across the Potomac into Maryland, while he himself, with the bulk of his army, moved up the Cumberland Valley, to cross at Williamsport and Sharpstown.

Before leaving the Capital, General McClellan, whose official district was not definitely specified, but who went wherever danger threatened the country, suggested the propriety of abandoning Harper's Ferry, and fortifying Maryland Heights, which he considered impregnable. General Wool, in whose Department both places lay, was advised with; he communicated with Colonel Miles, commandant of Harper's Ferry, and received the assurance that he would hold the Ferry under all circumstances against any force. McClellan could not do more.

On the 11th September he occupied Barnsville, and took possession of Sugar Loaf Mountain; while Gen. Lee issued on the same day a proclamation to the people of Maryland, calling upon them to join the rebellion. On the 13th of September McClellan entered Frederick City, whence the rebels had made a hasty retreat; on the 15th Hooker and Reno drove the rebels, at the point of the bayonet, from South Mountain, and gained possession of Middletown; in both of which engagements the rebels occupied positions on the top of a mountain ridge, while our men had to attack them up hill. Lee had, in the meantime, sent Jackson to feel Harper's Ferry, and to that General's agreeable surprise, the commander of that place surrendered on Monday 16th, after having not even been asked to do so by the enemy. This act, against which McClellan had cautioned the President, which could not have been done in better style if Jeff. Davis had appointed and instructed the commandant, gave to Lee's army the benefit of two bridges across the Potomac, of about 12,000

superior rifles, 50 guns, numerous small arms, quantities of ammunition, of stores, of uniforms, and of equipments of all kinds; deprived the Union army of over 10,000 fighting men, and added to Lee's available force all the men otherwise required to take care of Harper's Ferry. It further prevented McClellan from advancing his army above Harper's Ferry, and deprived him of the only bridge across the river that could have been of advantage to him. Lee concentrated his forces, to prevent the passage of Antietam Creek by the Union army; McClellan considered the point of sufficient importance, and the time about as good as any other for a fight. On the 17th of September, the Rebel army and the Union army, for the first time during the war, stood arrayed against each other in regular line of battle, with a front about four miles in length. For the first time did the topography of the country present an opportunity to the commanding Generals to have an almost unobstructed view of both the hostile armies. This circumstance necessitated a management of the armies entirely different from that in all the previous important contests during this rebellion. Every strategical error, every tactical imperfection or hesitation, was at once perceived and taken advantage of by the opposite party. The personal influence of the commanding generals became for the first time during this war instantaneously perceptible on every point of the battle-field. The generals in chief command knew that in every movement, in every new combination, everywhere on the field, they met the intellect, the skill, the talent, of their opponent, personified in tens of thousands of living chess-men. On the rebel side, Stonewall Jackson, Ewell, Longstreet, Hill, and others commanded the various corps, under the supreme command of Robert Lee.

Burnside and Porter on the left, Hooker and Franklin on the right; Sumner, Mansfield, Reno, and Richardson, between them, and Pleasonton, in reserve, held the principal commands under McClellan. Lee's army consisted of experienced soldiers, who had fought their way into this battle field from the interior of Rebeldom. McClellan's army had, only three week's ago, under a leader unworthy to command such men, suffered a fearful defeat at the hands of their opponents, had lost many of their best officers, and was to the greater part made up of raw recruits, who had never been under fire. Nevertheless the Union army opened the ball early in the morning with artillery on the right, and gradually all the corps became engaged.

A battle commenced which lasted all the day, in which the most stubborn resistance on the part of the rebels, was overcome with cold

steel in the hands of Union soldiers, with strong arms and enduring muscles. Heroic deeds by the officers and men on both sides, call for the admiration of the world, while it curses the fanatic demagogues who have brought about and who now foster this unjustifiable war between brothers. The armies moved to and fro, and the line of battle shaped itself into that of a serpentine, changing frequently the convex to the concave, and *vice versa.* The passage of Antietam Bridge, work laid out for the noble Burnside, was hotly contested by Lee, who at once discovered the importance of the point, and by the assistance of his three bridges across the river, moved immense forces on his right; but all in vain, again and again the Union soldiers would return to the charge, till finally they triumphed, and the bridge was taken and retained, although we are positively assured that Burnside's corps was out of ammunition the last half hour of the fight. Darkness found McClellan in the position occupied by Lee in the morning. Lee was driven about two miles back; both armies equally exhausted, rested on their arms, On the 18th, neither of the combatants felt inclined to renew the battle. On the 19th, when McClellan, who had been reinforced during the night, advanced, he found the rebel army in full retreat across the Potomac, at Harper's Ferry, Sheppardstown, and Williamsport, leaving all their dead, most of their wounded, and a great many stragglers behind. Harper's Ferry was also evacuated by the rebels after they had destroyed the bridges, and was taken possession of by our troops. Thus, fifteen days after he had taken command of a demoralized and defeated army, and ten days after he had left Washington, McClellan, with the gallant officers and men under his command, had driven the rebel army out of Maryland, and saved Pennsylvania from invasion; had fought three battles, the last of them the greatest and the most important ever fought on this continent, against the Commander-in-Chief of the rebel army, an officer of acknowledged ability, assisted by Stonewall Jackson, by Longstreet, by Hill, and by Ewell. These names have been connected with almost every battle in the East. A more brilliant campaign is not recorded in history. The same man who last winter used the spade to construct fortifications, which last summer saved the National Capital; who carefully organized, disciplined and militarized the army of the Potomac, which by its efficacy to day gives the country the benefit of the care and devotion bestowed upon them by their commanders; who secured his position on the Chickahominy by earthworks, which enabled him to defeat the gigantic combinations of the rebel leaders for his destruction; who, with the utmost precaution

and without the loss of a single man, moved his entire army from Harrison's Landing to Alexandria; this same man, in his ten days campaign in Maryland, displays a rapidity, a boldness, a dash, unsurpassed by any chieftain. The Governor of Pennsylvania had called out the militia and moved them to the exposed frontier of that State, which movement had undoubtedly its influence upon the rebel armies.

The loss of both armies engaged in Maryland was enormous: the rebel General Garland was killed, and the total number of killed, wounded and prisoners in Lee's army is probably near 25,000, while the Union has to mourn the loss of the distinguished Generals Mansfield and Reno among the killed; the gallant Hooker, Weber and Hatch among the wounded, and in round numbers probably 12,000 killed and put *hors du combat.* That General Lee retreated immediately after the battle of Antietam, proves him to be a General of great foresight. Knowing better than anybody else the exhausted state of his army and being able to form a correct opinion of the condition of the Union army, he at once estimated the advantage under which he could recross the Potomac, with his army divided in small commands, availing themselves of every ford that could be found, if not harrassed by the Union army, and protected in case of an assault from cavalry and a few pieces of artillery by his corps at Harper's Ferry, at Shepherdstown and at Williamsport. He saw how much more orderly his army could move and how much smaller the loss in stragglers and wounded would be, than if awaiting a renewal of the battle, the result of which, in all probability could not be different from that just fought; he would have to retreat, pressed by McClellan, and to recross the river in concentrated masses, therefore with greater danger, and most likely harrassed by the long range Union guns. He therefore improving the chance of a very rainy and very foggy night, commenced his retrogade movement at once, and succeeded in reaching the Virginia shore; he then withdrew his reserves from the three principal crossing places above mentioned, destroyed the bridges and placed the Potomac between himself and the Union army.

The reasons which induced McClellan not to renew the battle on the 18th are stronger even than those that governed Lee in his decision to retreat. The Union army in all its corps had had a very hard day's work, which in particular told upon the new troops; it was almost entirely out of ammunition; by the extreme efforts only of officers and men the rebels had been forced to retreat. To lead these same troops (he had no others), into battle again before they were fully rested, would have induced so skillful a General as Robert Lee to slowly fall

back, to draw McClellan with his fatigued troops after him, till he had placed his own army under the protection of Maryland Heights. From this strong position his artillery would have caused fearful havoc in the Union army, while the best rebel troops would have been selected, allowed a few hours rest and refreshments, after which they would have been led to attack McClellan, and in all probability with success; because desperate positions call forth the most powerful exertions of men. Upon this truth is based the old strategic maxim: "build golden bridges for a retreating enemy." Why did McClellan not follow Lee across the river when on the 19th and 20th he had rested his army and had received reinforcements? He could not do it, because he and the Government had not troops enough to do it with, and the latter has not yet been able to make good the great losses in shoes, uniforms and ammunition, suffered by the army during the lamentable campaign under General Pope. To cross the Potomac without bridges, in the face of Lee's batteries on the opposite shore, is an entirely different affair from that performed by the rebel army, who had all the bridges across and both sides of the river in their possession. Had the government had troops, General Halleck would have sent Sigel, who is always ready, with 20,000 men on the Virginia side to Harper's Ferry to destroy the bridges before Lee could use them, and thereby to place the rebel army between two fires. The call for 300,000 volunteers was made in July instead of March, 1862, when it ought to have been. The most urgent appeals from all quarters to send volunteers to fill up the ranks of the old, instead of raising new regiments, met with no hearty response from the State governments. Generals Sickles and Meagher truly said, the process is too slow by which a citizen is transformed into a soldier. To organise new regiments, under inexperienced officers, requires more time than the country at this crisis could spare; the country, as well as Generals Halleck, McClellan and Sigel, have for the present to rest content with what has been achieved in September last.

The withdrawal of the Pennsylvania militia, the moment the enemy was out of sight, shows the want of co-operation between the State and United States Governments. The unprotected condition of the Potomac, above and below the position occupied by the army under McClellan, we have to put down as another evidence that neither Gen. Halleck nor Gen. Wool had any troops to protect the river. That Gen. Lee sent only a cavalry raid into Pennsylvania, instead of taking his entire army there, we consider the strongest evidence of their

crippled condition. He might be forced to a hasty retreat, or could be badly cut up in battle, if the corps under Gens. Heintzelman and Sigel, in Virginia, and the army under McClellan, in Maryland, were in a perfect state of efficiency. As it is, Sigel has to wait for horses to mount his cavalry, and McClellan for other necessaries for his troops, and the country has to be patient.

But how is it possible that the advance of the Union armies has to be delayed for want of proper equipment, armament or ammunition; while the rebels, who are cut off from the entire world by our effective blockade, who have no large boot, shoe and other factories, such as the North, and Massachusetts in particular, can justly boast of, can and do move their large armies speedily, and always prepared, from battle field to battle field?

Probably because the utterly despotic government of Jefferson Davis is forced to concentrate all its energies, first and foremost, for the purpose of keeping up the highest possible state of efficiency in the rebel army, upon which alone depends the existence of that Government and the success of their rebellious intentions, and further because the Confederates own all the slaves, and therefore do not trouble themselves about the slavery question.

The smoke of the battle of Antietam had hardly cleared off, the slain had not all been buried, and the wounded had not all yet been cared for, when on the 22d of September, President Lincoln issued the most important document that ever emanated from any President of these United States—his Proclamation abolishing Slavery in all the Southern States that on the first day of January next shall be in rebellion.

The proclamation, at that moment, took the country by surprise; the people anxiously waited to learn that man's opinion about this document, who but a few days ago had saved the Capital and probably the Administration of his country. He took his own time to consider a subject of so immeasurable importance for good or for evil to the civilized world.

On the 7th day of October, General McClellan issued the following order to the army under his command:

GENERAL ORDERS—NO. 163.

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
CAMP NEAR SHARPSBURG, Md., Oct. 7, 1862.

The attention of the officers and soldiers of the Army of the Potomac is called to General Orders No. 130, War Department, Sept. 24, 1862, publishing to the army the President's proclamation of Sept. 22.

A proclamation of such grave moment to the nation, officially communicated to the army, affords to the General commanding an opportunity of defining specifically to the officers and soldiers under his command the relation borne by all persons in the military service of the United States towards the civil authorities of the Government. The constitution confides to the civil authorities, legislative, judicial, and executive, the power and duty of making, expounding, and executing the federal laws. Armed forces are raised and supported simply to sustain the civil authorities, and are to be held in strict subordination thereto in all respects. This fundamental rule of our political system is essential to the security of our republican institutions, and should be thoroughly understood and observed by every soldier. The principle upon which, and the objects for which, armies shall be employed in suppressing the rebellion, must be determined and declared by the civil authorities, and the chief Executive, who is charged with the administration of the national affairs, is the proper and only source through which the views and orders of the Government can be made known to the armies of the nation.

Discussion by officers and soldiers, concerning public measures determined upon and declared by the Government, when carried at all beyond the ordinary temperate and respectful expression of opinion, tend greatly to impair and destroy the discipline and efficiency of troops by substituting the spirit of political faction for that firm, steady, and earnest support of the authority of the Government which is the highest duty of the American soldier. The remedy for political errors, if any are committed, is to be found only in the action of the people at the polls.

In thus calling the attention of the army to the true relation between the soldiers and the Government, the General commanding merely adverts to an evil against which it has been thought advisable during our whole history to guard the armies of the Republic, and in so doing he will not be considered by any right minded person as casting any reflection upon that loyalty and good conduct which has been so fully illustrated upon so many battle fields. In carrying out all measures of public policy this army will, of course, be guided by the same rules of mercy and Christianity that have ever controlled its conduct towards the defenceless.

By command of

Major-General McCLELLAN.

JAMES A. HARDEE, Lieutenant-Colonel, Aid-de-Camp, and Acting Assistant Adjutant General.

This order relieved the anxiety of the people, because it conveys the redeeming assurance that the almost universal corruption, threatening the ruin of the country, has left us at least one man; a soldier unsurpassed by the most famous of any age; adored by an army composed of his fellow citizens; the hero of some of the greatest battles ever fought—who, ill treated in the most unwarrantable manner by the Administration, at the very moment when corrupt officials allow his army to suffer from want of the indispensable necessaries, and prevent him from following up his successes in the field — while people unacquainted with this fact complain of his inactivity — tells those tens of thousands under his command, and shows by his own acts, that he holds obedience to the constitutional laws of his country to be the first and most sacred duty of the soldier as of the citizen in a Republic, and who thereby proves himself "a patriot."

F. A. P.

New York, October 25, 1862.

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